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ABSTRACT 
 
Levels of reliability (safety) for civil engineering designs are normally established 
from historical precedent, by specification committees, or based on the variability of 
loads and resistances.  It is common to establish a single target level of reliability for all 
structures of similar type based on general consideration of costs and anticipated 
performance.  While establishing a single target value makes implementation 
straightforward, it requires that target values be established based on broad consideration 
of many structures rather than more refined consideration of individual structures.  In 
some cases, use of broadly established target levels of reliability can lead to excessive 
costs for construction, while in other cases use of broadly established targets may lead to 
poorer performance than is desired. 
The research reported herein proposes an approach to establish target levels of 
reliability from combined consideration of socially acceptable risk and economic 
optimization.  Socially acceptable risk is generally represented through FN curves, which 
 xxii 
 
describe socially acceptable relations between frequency of failure (F) and number of 
lives lost (N), or some other undesired consequence.  Economic optimization involves 
minimization of total infrastructure cost through evaluation of the potential costs of 
failure or unacceptable performance and the required investment to reduce the likelihood 
of unacceptable performance.  Total cost (life cycle cost) is expressed as a function of the 
probability of failure using the concept of the expected monetary value.  The economic 
optimization analysis includes mathematical minimization of a total cost function and, in 
the present work, probabilistic analysis of the likelihood of unacceptable performance for 
bridge foundations and approach embankments.  
Cost functions were developed using reliability analyses and estimated or 
historical costs for pile groups, drilled shafts, spread footings and bridge approach 
embankments for different consequence levels.  The minimum values from these 
functions were used to establish optimum probabilities of failure that minimize expected 
total cost as a function of consequences.  These economically optimized probabilities of 
failure were plotted on FN charts and compared and evaluated with respect to socially 
acceptable risk boundaries.  Recommended target levels of reliability were established 
from these comparisons using engineering judgment.  
 1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Historically, engineers have compensated for variability and uncertainty in bridge 
foundation design using experience and subjective judgment.  New approaches are 
evolving to better quantify the uncertainties involved in design and achieve rational 
engineering designs with more consistent levels of reliability.  Load and Resistance 
Factor Design (LRFD) is one such approach.   
Geotechnical engineers have traditionally used the Allowable Stress Design 
(ASD) method that collectively accounts for uncertainties in all design loads and 
resistances in a single factor of safety.  In ASD, load combinations are treated without 
explicitly considering the probability of having a higher-than-expected load and a lower-
than-expected strength occurring at the same time and place (Kulicki et al., 2007).  In 
contrast, LRFD allows designers to independently account for variability and uncertainty 
in different loads and resistances by applying different load or resistance factors for each 
parameter.  The load and resistance factors can be calibrated probabilistically, thereby 
allowing designers to achieve more uniform and consistent levels of reliability in super 
structure and substructure designs.   
Currently there is interest in comprehensive study of appropriate levels of safety 
(reliability) for civil engineering designs.  Target levels of reliability, which can also be 
expressed as the probability of failure, for LRFD are established by an AASHTO 
specification committee (Chang, 2006) or are chosen as a function of the variability of 
 2 
 
loads and resistances (KDOT, 1998).  In the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design 
specifications (AASHTO, 2004), the design probability of failure for bridge foundations 
is established as approximately 1 in 10,000 (0.0001).  More commonly, the design target 
is defined in terms of a “reliability index” (β) that is related to the probability of failure.  
For a probability of failure of 0.0001, β equals 3.57 if loads and resistances are assumed 
to follow lognormal distributions, and 3.72 if they follow normal distributions.   
The research reported herein considers an alternative approach to establish target 
levels of reliability based on consideration of socially acceptable risk and economic 
optimization.  Socially acceptable risk is generally represented through FN curves, which 
describe socially acceptable relations between frequency of failure (F) and number of 
lives lost (N), or some other undesired consequence.  Economic optimization involves 
minimization of total infrastructure cost through evaluation of the potential costs of 
failure or unacceptable performance and the required investment to reduce the likelihood 
of unacceptable performance.  The total cost (life cycle cost) for a structure or structural 
component is expressed as a function based on the concept of the expected monetary 
value.  The economic optimization analysis includes the mathematical minimization of 
the total cost function and, in the present work, economic analyses considering the 
likelihood of failure of bridge foundations and approach embankments.  
 
1.2 Hypothesis and Objective 
The hypothesis underlying this research is that target levels of reliability (or levels 
of safety) for design of geotechnical infrastructure using LRFD can be established 
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through combined consideration of economically optimized life cycle costs and societal 
tolerance to risk.   
The objective of this study is to establish target levels of reliability for bridge 
foundations and approach embankments through completion of the following tasks:   
1. Document published tolerable limits for socially acceptable levels of risk. 
2. Determine the optimum levels of reliability based on minimization of a life 
cycle cost function and economic analyses considering the likelihood of 
failure for geotechnical infrastructure.   
3. Compare optimal levels of reliability established from economic 
considerations with socially acceptable levels of risk and make 
recommendations for target levels of reliability to be used for design of 
geotechnical infrastructure.   
 
1.3 Scope of the Work 
The scope of work to evaluate the hypothesis and meet the objectives includes: 
 Compile and synthesize relevant literature on current levels of safety as well 
as information related to societal tolerance for risk. 
 Establish mathematical functions to quantify life cycle costs for bridge 
foundations and approach embankments as a function of the probability of 
failure used for design.  Required inputs to these functions are derived from 
costs for repair/replacement and costs for construction of bridge foundations 
and approach embankments designed for different probabilities of failure.   
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 Obtain historical and/or estimated costs for repair and replacement of bridges 
subject to different levels of performance in the State of Missouri to establish 
required inputs for the economic optimization.  
 Develop functions relating construction costs for driven piles, drilled shafts, 
spread footings, and approach embankments to the probabilities of failure 
used for design of these foundations, also used to develop inputs for the 
economic optimization analyses.   
 Perform economic optimization analyses using costs for construction and 
repair/replacement to identify economically optimized probabilities of failure 
for driven piles, drilled shafts, spread footings and approach embankments. 
 Compare the optimized probabilities of failure derived from the economic 
analyses with probabilities of failure established from societally acceptable 
risk and, using engineering judgment, propose target levels of reliability for 
design of bridge foundations and approach embankments. 
 Develop recommendations for use of the proposed target levels of reliability. 
 
1.4 Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters including this introduction. The 
literature review in Chapter 2 summarizes important risk concepts, defines relevant 
terms, summarizes existing studies and guidelines developed to control and regulate risk 
for different types of infrastructure, and describes current practices to establish target 
probabilities of failure.  The strategy developed to establish target levels of reliability is 
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described in Chapter 3.  Equations used to represent total costs and to establish the 
optimum probabilities of failure are also presented in Chapter 3.  Data collected to 
establish a relation between initial cost and repair/replacement costs for bridges is 
presented in Chapter 4.  Analyses performed to establish relations between the 
probability of failure and construction costs to decrease the probability of failure for 
driven piles, drilled shafts, spread footings, and bridge approach embankments are 
described in Chapter 5.  In addition, analyses performed to evaluate the sensitivity of the 
relations to various inputs are also presented.  Results of the economic optimization 
analyses are presented in the form of curves that identify the economically optimized 
probability of failure as a function of consequence costs on FN charts in Chapter 6.  
These curves are compared with societally acceptable probabilities of failure to establish 
the recommended probabilities of failure for design of bridge foundation and approach 
embankments.  Considerations for use of the recommended target probabilities of failure 
are presented in Chapter 7.  Finally, Chapter 8 includes a summary of the dissertation, 
along with conclusions and recommendations for expanding this work.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is limited information in the literature regarding acceptable levels of risk 
and/or target values for the probability of failure for design of geotechnical infrastructure.  
The limited information that is available is mostly derived from other disciplines and 
applications.   
The information included in this chapter was compiled to develop the analysis 
strategy and concepts that were used throughout the research.  Section 2.2 includes 
information and definitions for several terms such as risk, societal tolerability for risk, the 
concept of willingness to pay to reduce risk, and the value of life.  Section 2.3 is focused 
on studies and guidelines developed by agencies around the world to control and mitigate 
risk.  Section 2.4 summarizes current target probabilities of failure used for design of 
bridge foundations.  
 
2.2 Definitions and Concepts 
2.2.1 Risk 
Several definitions of risk can be found in the literature.  The World English 
dictionary defines risk as the possibility of suffering harm or loss.  From a quantitative 
perspective, the insurance industry quantifies risk as the monetary value of insured 
casualty (Baecher and Christian, 2003); from this perspective, risk is taken to be a 
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function of potential consequences expressed as a monetary value.  In the public health 
profession, risk is commonly defined as the probability or the fraction of people that 
become ill due to some pathogen exposure (disease); in this instance, risk is taken to be a 
function of the probability or likelihood of illness.  Thus, risk can have different 
meanings in different disciplines.   
Baecher and Christian (2003) state that risk is derived from a combination of the 
likelihood an uncertain event and adverse consequences associated with that event.  In 
engineering contexts, risk is commonly defined quantitatively as the product of 
probability and consequence and is expressed as: 
 Risk = probability   consequence 2.1 
An extension of this definition when more than one event may lead to an adverse 
outcome is to consider risk being defined as:  
 


n
i
iicpRisk
1
 2.2 
where n is the number of independent and mutually exclusive event scenarios i, pi is the 
probability of occurrence (per year) of scenario i, and ci is the consequence associated 
with scenario i (Diamantidis et al., 2006).  When dealing with physical losses, risk can be 
quantified as the product of the cost of an element at risk and the probability of 
occurrence of the event with a given magnitude/intensity (Van Western et al., 2005). 
Accepting the engineering definition of risk to be the product of two quantitative 
factors (probability and consequence), it is intuitive that risk is a quantitative expression. 
However, according to the Australian Geomechanics Society (AGS, 2000), a more 
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general interpretation of risk involves a comparison of the probability and consequences 
in a non-product form, therefore risk can also be considered a qualitative expression.  
In general, the word “risk” is defined and quantified in various ways depending 
on the practice. This research will adopt the definition of risk as the annual likelihood of 
an adverse outcome (failure) multiplied by the costs associated with the failure or limit 
state event.  In this form, risk takes the units of cost and is generally expressed as a dollar 
amount.   
2.2.2 Acceptable and Tolerable Levels of Risk 
It is important to distinguish between acceptable levels of risk that society desires 
to achieve, and tolerable risks that they will live with, even though they would prefer 
lower risks (AGS, 2000).  Risk criteria generally do not have absolute boundaries.  
Society shows a wide range of tolerance to risk and quantitative risk criteria are only a 
mathematical expression of general societal opinion (AGS, 2000).  Tolerable levels of 
risk also vary from country to country, and even within countries, depending on historic 
exposure.  Every individual also has their own perception of acceptable risk (Diamantidis 
et al., 2006).   
In the United States, levels of acceptable or unacceptable risks are often 
established by regulatory agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  However, Baecher and Christian (2003) note that “in 
the United States, the government acting through Congress has not defined acceptable 
levels of risk for civil infrastructure, or for most regulated activities”.  Some insight into 
tolerable risks can be derived from looking at statistical occurrence of deaths from 
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different causes and presuming that these rates are considered acceptable.  Tables 2.1 and 
2.2 show the average risk of death to individuals and society, respectively, from various 
natural and human-caused events.  More specifically in the area of geotechnical 
engineering, the Australian Geomechanics Society has recommended the tolerable risks 
for loss of life due to failure of earth slopes shown in Table 2.3 (AGS, 2000).   
Table 2.1 Average risk of death to an individual (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
1975, taken from by Baecher and Christian, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Risk of death to society (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1975, taken from 
Baecher and Christian, 2003) 
 
Probability of 100 Probability of 1000
 or more fatalities          or more
Human-Caused
Airplane Crash 1 in 2 yrs. 1 in 2,000 yrs.
Fire 1 in 7 yrs. 1 in 200 yrs.
Explosion 1 in 16 yrs. 1 in 120 yrs.
Toxic Gas 1 in 100 yrs. 1 in 1,000 yrs.
Natural
Tornado 1 in 5 yrs. very small
Hurricane 1 in 5 yrs. 1 in 25 yrs.
Earthquake 1 in 20 yrs. 1 in 50 yrs.
Meteorite Impact 1 in 100,000 yrs. 1 in 1 million yrs.
Type of event
Individual chance
per year
Motor Vehicle 55,791 1 in 4,000
Falls 17,827 1 in 10,000
Fires and Hot Substances 7,451 1 in 25,000
Drowning 6,181 1 in 30,000
Firearms 2,309 1 in 100,000
Air Travel 1,778 1 in 100,000
Falling Objects 1,271 1 in 160,000
Electrocution 1,148 1 in 160,000
Lightning 160 1 in 2,500,000
Tornadoes 91 1 in 2,500,000
Hurricans 93 1 in 2,500,000
All Accidents 111,992 1 in 1,600
Accident type Total number
 10 
 
Table 2.3 Suggested tolerable risks for loss of life due to slope failure (AGS, 2000) 
 
 
Societal acceptance of risk is influenced by whether the risk is considered 
voluntary or involuntary.  Heroic acts, participation in sports, and driving a car are 
examples of voluntary risks while being exposed to diseases or pollutants are generally 
considered involuntary risks.  According to Stern et al. (1996), just being alive in the 
United States or Europe carries a probability of dying of about 1.5 x 10
-6
 per hour.  Some 
risk analysts consider this number, about 10
-6
, as a baseline to which other risks might be 
compared.  In the case of voluntary risk, an individual decides whether or not to accept a 
risk.  This decision is based on a subjective balance between risk and benefits.  In 1969, 
Starr (Starr, 1969) stated four conclusions regarding acceptable risk: (1) the public is 
willing to accept “voluntary” risks roughly 1000 times greater than “involuntary” risks; 
(2) the statistical risk of death from disease appears to be the psychological yardstick for 
establishing the level of acceptability of other risks; (3) the acceptability of risk appears 
to be proportional to the third power of the benefits; and (4) societal acceptance of risk is 
influenced by public awareness of the benefits of an activity, as determined by 
advertising, usefulness, and number of people participating.  
Societal acceptance or tolerability to risk is also influenced by the costs associated 
with reducing the risk.  In most cases, decreasing risk requires investment or additional 
Situation Suggested Tolerable Risk for Loss of Life.
Existing slopes 10
-4
 person most at risk
10
-5
 average of persons at risk
New Slopes 10
-5
 person most at risk
10
-6
 average of persons at risk
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costs in order to make something more reliable or to guard against potential 
consequences.  Society has been found to tolerate higher levels of risk in situations where 
it is quite costly to decrease risk.   
 
2.2.3 The Value of Life 
The value of human life is an important economic consideration that is 
quantitatively calculated for purposes that include economics, health care, adoption, 
political economy, insurance, worker safety, environmental impact, etc. The correct 
numerical value for a life, typically called the “value of a statistical life” (VSL), is 
understandably a matter of great controversy (Viscusi, 2005). Some people feel that it is 
not possible to put an economic price tag on a human life because it is "priceless". Other 
people consider that computing the value of life is an immoral academic exercise. 
However, according to Viscusi (2003), these computations are not meant to measure what 
should be paid for somebody to forfeit his life, but rather to measure how that person 
values risk-reducing or risk-increasing activities.  
According to Viscusi (2000), over the past decades, numerous studies have tried 
to measure the VSL. Data has come from the labor market, the housing market, and 
automobile purchases.  In 2003, Viscusi estimated that the VSL in the United States ran 
between $3 million and $9 million. Similar valuations held for other developed countries 
like Japan and Australia (Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4 Value of Statistical Life based on 2000 US dollars (Viscusi, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the United States, the most recent evaluation made in July of 2008 by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), estimates the VSL as $6.9 million in 2008 
dollars. This value is a drop of nearly $1 million from 2003 (Figure 2.1). The value 
estimated by the EPA is not based on people’s earning capacity but instead by what 
people are willing-to-pay (WTP) to avoid certain risks and how much employers pay 
their workers to take additional risks. As a hypothetical example, if a person is willing to 
pay $50,000 dollars to decrease by one percent (1/100) the probability of being killed in 
an accident then the value of his life is 100 times $50,000 or $5 million.  
   
Figure 2.1 Value of Life in the United States (EPA, 2008) 
Study/Country Value of Statistical Life ($millions)
Median value from 30 US studies 7.0
Australia 4.2
Austria 3.9 - 6.5
Canada 3.9 - 4.7
Hong Kong 1.7
India 1.2 - 1.5
Japan 9.7
South Korea 0.8
Switzerland 6.3 - 8.6
Taiwan 0.2 - 0.9
United Kingdom 4.2
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In January of 1993, the United States Department of Transportation adopted a 
guidance memorandum, "Treatment of Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic 
Evaluations (McCormick, et al., 1993)," which set forth recommended economic values 
to be used in Departmental regulatory and investment analyses. The guidance raises the 
value of a statistical life to $5.8 million for use by the Department of Transportation 
when assessing the benefit of preventing fatalities.  
2.2.4 Willingness to Pay 
In economics, the willingness to pay is the amount a person is willing to pay, in 
order to receive a good or to avoid something undesired. According to Kenkel (2003), 
individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a given reduction in mortality risks probably 
differs depending upon the cause of death. People may be willing to pay substantially 
more to reduce risks where there is a lengthy period of morbidity preceding death, both 
because of the value of morbidity avoided and the psychological costs of imminent death. 
Limited evidence suggests that WTP to reduce mortality risks varies over the life cycle of 
working age adults. A theoretical analysis of the relationship between the VSL and age 
showed an inverted U-shape, with a peak around the age of 40 years, dropping to about 
50 to 70 percent of the peak by the age of 60 (Kenkel, 2003).  
 
2.3 FN Charts  
FN charts are a graphical presentation of information about the frequency of fatal 
accidents in a system and the distribution of the numbers of fatalities in such accidents. 
FN plots are charts of the frequency F of accidents with N or more fatalities, where N 
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ranges upward from one (1.0) to the maximum possible number of fatalities in the 
system. Values of F for high values of N are often of particular political interest, because 
these are the frequencies for high-fatality accidents. Because the values of both F and N 
sometimes range across several orders of magnitude, FN graphs are usually drawn with 
logarithmic scales (Evans, 2003). 
Curves on FN charts can be used to define regions or levels of risks that are 
generally dependent on societal acceptability for the loss of life. FN charts assist 
analyzing the practicability, from an operational or financial perspective, of taking 
measures to reduce the level of risk where measures are available.  
The establishment of acceptable levels of risk for bridge foundations and 
embankments requires the investigation of FN charts. Studies and guidelines developed 
by agencies around the world to control and mitigate risk using FN charts are presented 
in the following sections. 
2.3.1 Hong Kong Government Planning Department (1994).  
The Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines (Hong Kong Government’s 
Planning Department, 1994) is a document produced by the Hong Kong Government’s 
Planning Department to be used for Potentially Hazardous Installations (PHI) that store 
hazardous materials in quantities equal or greater than a specific threshold. According to 
the document, all explosive factories and governmental explosive depots are classified as 
PHIs. The threshold quantities suggested in the document follow the specifications used 
in the UK’s Notification of Installations Handling Substance Regulations (Health and 
Safety, 1982). The Hong Kong Government’s policy is to control the potential risks 
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associated with a PHI to meet internationally acceptable levels. Controlling the potential 
risks is generally accomplished by controlling the site and land-use in the vicinity of the 
PHI, and by requiring that the installation be constructed and operated to specific 
standards. 
In December of 1986, the Coordinating Committee on Land-use Planning and 
Control relating to Potentially Hazardous Installations (CCPHI) was established to 
coordinate government actions in relation to PHIs in Hong Kong. A set of Risk 
Guidelines was adopted by CCPHI to assess the off-site risk levels of PHIs. These 
guidelines are expressed in terms of individual and societal risks. The individual risk is 
defined as the predicted increase in the chance of death per year of an individual that 
lives or works near a PHI. The individual risk decreases with distance from the PHI. The 
estimated duration of exposure of a person to the PHI is taken into account. The CCPHI 
individual Risk Guidelines requires that the maximum level of off-site individual risk 
associated with PHIs should not exceed 1 in 100,000 per year, i.e. 1 x 10
-5
/year. As a 
reference, the Hong Kong Planning Department considers the average annual risk of 
dying in a traffic accident is about 1 in 100,000 (10
-5
/year). 
According to the Risk Guidelines, societal risk expresses the risks to a whole 
population living near a PHI. The societal Risk Guidelines is expressed in an FN chart 
(Figure 2.2). The accepted societal risk is established from the frequency and number of 
deaths of potential incidents at a PHI. In order to avoid major disasters resulting in more 
than 1000 deaths, the FN chart includes a vertical cut-off line at the 1000 fatality level 
extending down to a frequency of 1 in a billion years. 
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Figure 2.2 Societal risk guidelines FN chart of acceptable levels of risk for the whole 
population living near a potentially hazardous installation (Hong Kong Government 
Planning Department, 1994). 
 
2.3.2 External Safety Policy in the Netherlands (1987).  
An Approach to Risk Management (Versteeg, 1987) is a document that describes 
the use of risk management by the Dutch government in their external safety policy. Few 
risk quantification studies and models existed at the time of the policy’s inception apart 
from Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) in nuclear industries. The document 
addresses aspects such as: risk identification, risk quantification, risk assessment, risk 
reduction and risk control. According to the document, it is necessary to quantify risk as 
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accurately and as scientifically as possible and to compare the results with quantitative 
standards to make policy decisions as objective as possible. 
Three areas of risk were distinguished: the normal risk level, where permissible 
activities lie; excessive risk levels, where risks are unacceptable; and an intermediate 
range of risk, where reduction of risk is desirable. This concept is applied to protect 
individuals from death and prevents disasters that could affect large populations. 
Individual risk is defined as the expected frequency with which a hypothetical person 
permanently located at a given distance from the hazardous source would be killed. 
Group risk is defined as the probability that a single accident may cause more than a 
specified number of prompt fatalities. Mortality per year from natural causes is used as 
the evaluation criterion to determine the limit of unacceptability for individual risk. The 
lowest magnitude is 10
-4
 per year for children between 10 and 15 years old. The policy 
adopted is that an industrial activity should not increase this background mortality risk by 
more than 1 percent. The upper bound of acceptable individual risk is 1 in 1,000,000 per 
year (10
-6
/year). An individual risk of 1 in 100,000,000 (10
-8
/year) or lower is considered 
negligible. 
To identify the societal impact, two Complementary Cumulative Frequency 
Distribution (CCDFs) are chosen in the form of straight lines on log-log scale of the FN 
graph shown in Figure 2.3. A slope of negative 2 is chosen for the CCDFs to deal with 
risk aversion. Risk levels above the upper CCDF boundary, such having as 10 or more 
persons killed with a frequency of 10
-5
/year, is considered unacceptable. However below 
the lower CCDF, the risk is considered as acceptable. This criterion is applied to persons 
in the vicinity of an installation and to employees on the site.  
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Figure 2.3 Netherlands government group risk criterion (Versteeg, 1987) 
 
2.3.3 The Australian National Committee on Large Dams (1994).   
The Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) emphasizes the 
importance of planning systematic dam safety programs. The programs cover not only 
the assurance of quality in design and construction but also provide a framework for 
surveillance and review of safety throughout the life of a dam. ANCOLD guidelines 
present a professional body’s ‘recommendations’ rather than ‘requirements’ because 
ANCOLD has no authority to promulgate ‘requirements.’ However, ANCOLD 
guidelines serve as a de facto standard and they have also been formally adopted by dam 
safety regulators, in some cases with some modification. Also, some Australian dam 
owners have made meeting ANCOLD guidelines a corporate commitment, which surely 
must have some legal implications in itself if they do not meet their own clearly stated 
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commitments (Marsden, et al.  2007). The quantitative FN curves developed by 
ANCOLD are shown in Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4 Risk guideline from ANCOLD (1994) 
 
The ANCOLD guidelines on risk assessment drew heavily on the tolerability of 
risk framework developed by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) for the United 
Kingdom (HSE, 2001), thereby introducing the public safety policy principles recognized 
in other industries to the Australian dam safety scene. The importance of ANCOLD 
guidelines is that it provides a greater level of guidance than the majority of other 
guidelines. The concept of tolerability adopted by ANCOLD is essentially international, 
also being applied in 1993 by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and is 
strongly influenced by the HSE and endorsed by the UK Treasury (HM Treasury, 1996). 
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The ANCOLD guidelines propose limits of tolerability for both individual and 
societal risk. Once risks are reduced to the limit of tolerability, the ALARP (as low as 
reasonable practicable) principle is addressed. ALARP is met by comparing benefits and 
costs (or cost-effectiveness assessment) to establish whether additional reductions in the 
probability of failure will be worthwhile. The benefit-cost criteria for ALARP involve 
more than “benefits exceeding costs”. The ALARP principle is applied in a weighted or 
leveraged form, by inserting “factors of disproportionality” into the benefit-cost analysis 
to skew the outcome in favor of safety, in order to afford the dam owner a measure of 
protection against tort liability (Marsden et al., 2007).   
2.3.4 Risk Assessment of Nambe Falls Dam (1996). 
The risk assessment of Nambe Falls Dam is an investigation conducted under the 
US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) to modify the Nambe Falls Dam (New Mexico). The 
investigation included a seismological evaluation, a hydraulic investigation for flood 
levels and a geotechnical investigation to evaluate the foundation of the dam. A 
comprehensive and quantitative risk assessment was considered to estimate the 
probability of failure of the Nambe Falls Dam for several loading conditions. Risk 
assessment for the dam safety evaluation required identification of all loadings in the 
dam, potential failure modes as a result of those loads, and the consequence of failure.  
Probabilistic estimates of the loadings, of failure given by the loadings, and of the 
consequences of failure were used to quantify the risk assessment. Safety criteria 
involved a comparison of the product of the probabilistic estimates. Thus, quantitative 
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risk assessment required (1) identification of the risk and (2) determination of the 
acceptability of that risk.  
The USBR defines hazard for dams as the “potential for adverse consequence”. 
The three levels of hazard (low, significant and high), were developed using a “risk 
averse” approach (the greater the consequence, the less risk is accepted and the higher the 
safety standards). The FN chart shown in Figure 2.5 was used by the US Bureau of 
Reclamation for Nambe Falls Dam to compare risks faced by the existing dam with the 
ANCOLD limits.  
 
Figure 2.5 FN chart used by the US Bureau of Reclamation on Nambe Falls Dam, New 
Mexico to compare risks of the existing dam with ANCOLD limits (Von Thun, 1996). 
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2.3.5 Historical Performance of Civil Infrastructure 
An alternative means to establish acceptable levels of the probability of failure is 
to collect and analyze the historical occurrence of specific events or the historical 
performance of specific industries.  Baecher (1982) investigated the historical 
performance of different forms of civil infrastructure for this purpose. Figure 2.6 shows a 
graphic in the form of an FN chart that shows the historical performance of mine pit 
slopes, foundations, dams, and refineries, among others.  If the observed historical 
performance is presumed to be “acceptable”, then this performance can be used as a 
general guide to establish accepted values for the annual probability of failure for 
construction and operation of a variety of traditional civil facilities and other large 
structures or projects.  Two such boundaries were proposed by Baecher (1982): one 
corresponding to “marginally accepted” levels and one corresponding to “accepted” 
levels of reliability.  These results are widely cited in the literature on geotechnical 
reliability analyses.  The results are therefore used subsequently in this document as a 
reference for values that will be proposed for the target reliability. 
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Figure 2.6. Relationship between annual probability of failure (F) and lives lost (N) 
(expressed in terms of $ lost and lives lost) for common civil facilities (Baecher and 
Christian, 2003). 
 
In FN charts, the slope of the lines dividing regions of acceptability expresses a 
policy decision between the relative acceptability of low probability/high consequence 
events and high probability/low consequence events.  Steeper boundary lines reflect 
greater concern for high consequence events and relatively less concern for low 
consequence events while flatter boundary lines reflect more balanced concern for both 
low and high consequence events.  Note that the boundary line in the Hong Kong 
guidelines (Figure 2.2) has an absolute upper bound of 1000 fatalities, no matter how low 
the corresponding probability (Baecher and Christian, 2003).  
 24 
 
2.4 Current Levels of Reliability for the Design of Bridge Foundations 
Information on the target levels of reliability for design of bridge foundations at 
strength and service limit states is scarcely found in the literature. The AASHTO 
specification committee established a probability of failure for the strength limit state of 
one ten thousandth (1/10,000) in 2004 (Chang, 2006). Alternatively, the target reliability 
for design is often quantified using the “reliability index” (β), which is related to the 
probability of failure.  For a probability of failure of one in ten thousand, β equals 3.57 if 
performance is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution, and 3.72 if performance is 
assumed to follow a normal distribution. Alternative values have also been proposed by 
others.  Meyerhof (1970) suggested that the reliability index  for bridge foundations 
should be between 3 and 3.6.  Paikowsky et al. (2004) suggested that a target reliability 
index  between 2.0 and 2.5 may be appropriate for pile groups and that values as high as 
3.0 may be appropriate for single piles.  Based on evaluation of such historical 
recommendations, Paikowsky et al recommended that a probability of failure of 1 percent 
(be adopted for redundant pile groups (5 or more piles) whereas they 
recommended a target probability of failure of 0.1 percent () for non-redundant pile 
groups.  In some instances, the level of reliability is not established as a fix value but to 
vary as function of the variability of the loads and resistances. For example, according to 
the Kansas Department of Transportation design manual, a β factor of 2.5 is considered 
appropriate for conditions where the uncertainty is reduced (KDOT, 1998). 
When considering service limit states in the design of bridge foundations, the 
target reliability index is generally taken to be lower because the consequences of 
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exceeding service limit states are less than the consequences of exceeding strength limit 
states. AASHTO has no published target value for service limit states.  However, the 
Eurocode and ISO established a target reliability index  of 1.5 for service limit states. 
This reliability index was evaluated by examining the relations between the service 
criteria (e.g. vertical displacement) and the displacement associated with the maximum 
loading capacity of the structure (Paikowsky, 2005). 
 
2.5 Summary 
The literature review is divided in three parts. In the first part, the concept of risk 
was defined as the annual likelihood of an adverse outcome (failure) multiplied by the 
consequence cost of the failure. This first part also includes concepts of the value of 
statistical life (VSL), estimates of the VSL and concepts of the willing to pay to reduce 
mortality rates.  
The second part of the literature review is focused on the studies and guidelines 
developed by agencies around the world to control and mitigate risk. What these agencies 
have in common is that they all use FN charts to graphically visualize regions of risk 
acceptance.  
The third part of this chapter addresses practices to establish target levels of 
probability of failure, or reliability, for the design of bridge foundations. Currently the 
probability of failure is established by an ASSHTO specification committee at one ten 
thousandth which is equivalent to a reliability index  of .72 (normal distribution). For 
service limit, the Eurocode and ISO established a target reliability index  of 1.5.  
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The information found in the literature leads one to conclude that comprehensive 
study of appropriate levels of safety for civil engineering designs is lacking. The research 
reported herein proposes an alternative approach to establish target levels of reliability 
using combined consideration of societal acceptability and economic considerations as 
described in Chapter 3.  
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3 APPROACH FOR ESTABLISHING TARGET PROBABILITIES 
OF FAILURE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The hypothesis of this research is that effective and appropriate target levels of 
reliability for design of geotechnical infrastructure using LRFD can be established 
through combined consideration of economics and societal tolerance to risk. A 
description of the approach used to develop these target values for design of bridge 
foundations and earth slopes is presented in this chapter.  
 
3.2 Study Background  
Traditionally, the factor of safety (FS) for design of earth slopes and foundations 
has been calculated following Allowable Stress Design (ASD) concepts. The factor of 
safety calculated in ASD is intended to account for the variability and uncertainty in the 
loads and resistances collectively. Although this empirical method has been used 
successfully for many years, the approach suffers from lack of flexibility that makes it 
practically challenging to assign consistent levels of safety (conservatism) to different 
sites or different cases with different levels of variability and uncertainty. 
In the past 40 years, more rational and flexible approaches for design of earth 
slopes and foundations have been developed based on the use of probability theory.  New 
methods, including the Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) method, allow for 
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more consistent consideration of variability and uncertainty in a probabilistic way.  In 
general, the LRFD method consists of increasing the nominal predicted load(s) and 
decreasing the nominal predicted resistance(s) using “load factors” and “resistance 
factors”, respectively, to separately account for uncertainties in the load and resistance.  
While load and resistance factors can be established in several ways, these factors are 
most appropriately established as a function of the uncertainty or variability of the design 
parameters and some established target probability of failure.  
For example, Loehr et al. (2005) developed relationships (curves) that relate 
resistance factors to the variability and uncertainty of soil strength parameters and the 
target probability of failure for design of earth slopes.  An example of these relationships 
is shown in Figure 3.1.  In Figure 3.1, different curves are provided for different target 
values of the probability of slope failure.  The resistance factors were established to be 
dependent on the variability and uncertainty of the soil shear strength (expressed in terms 
of the coefficient of variation, COV) and a selected target probability of failure.  The 
objective of the research described here is to identify target probabilities of failure for 
such calibrations that effectively balance economic considerations and societal 
perspectives of risk. 
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Figure 3.1 Resistance factors developed for design of earth slopes (Loehr et al., 2005).  
 
3.3 General Approach for Establishing Target Probabilities of Failure 
Target probabilities of failure recommended in this document were established by 
first determining the probabilities of failure that would minimize costs associated with 
construction and operation of infrastructure, and then comparing these values with 
probabilities of failure that are considered to be “socially acceptable” based on previous 
studies presented in the literature.  The recommended target probabilities of failure were 
taken to be the lesser of the “economically optimized” and “socially acceptable” 
probabilities of failure for a given consequence level.  Thus, when the economically 
optimized probability of failure is less than the socially acceptable probability of failure, 
the target probability of failure is taken to be the probability of failure established from 
economic considerations.  Conversely, when the economically optimized probability of 
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failure exceeds the socially acceptable probability of failure, the target probability of 
failure was taken to be the socially acceptable one.  Thus, the recommended probabilities 
of failure always satisfy the constraint of social acceptability, but also reflect economic 
optimization when such optimization leads to probabilities of failure that are less than 
those considered to be “socially acceptable”.   
In general, both the economically optimized and socially acceptable probabilities 
of failure vary with the level of consequences.  Thus, the relation between the two 
probabilities of failure also varies with consequence level.  Figure 3.2 shows a conceptual 
comparison of economically optimized and socially acceptable probabilities of failure in 
the form of an FN chart in which the consequences of failure are expressed in terms of 
both number of human lives and monetary losses as explained in the literature review.  In 
this comparison, economically optimized probabilities of failure tend to be lower than 
socially acceptable probabilities of failure for relatively low consequence levels while 
socially acceptable probabilities of failure tend to be lower than economically optimized 
values for greater consequence levels.  Thus, in this instance, the target probabilities of 
failure would be controlled by economic considerations for low consequence levels and 
by socially acceptable probabilities for greater consequence levels.  Considerations used 
to develop the economically optimized and socially acceptable probabilities of failure are 
presented in the following sections.  
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Figure 3.2 FN chart comparing socially acceptable and economically optimized values 
for the probability of failure, Pf. 
 
3.4 Economically Optimized Probabilities of Failure 
For the present work, economically optimized probabilities of failure are 
established to minimize the expected monetary value.  In decision theory, the expected 
monetary value, denoted as E, is a measure of the value or utility expected to result from 
a given decision.  E is taken to be equal to the sum of the initial cost of a civil work and 
uncertain future costs, or “consequences”, associated with maintenance and repair.  In the 
case of civil works, consequences can be classified as recurring maintenance costs (e.g. 
painting bridge girders, vegetation control, drainage maintenance, etc) or unexpected 
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repair costs (repair of slides, repair or retrofit of bridge components due to excessive 
settlement, total failure and complete replacement, etc.).  
In the context of the present work, the term “consequence” is used to reflect the 
costs associated with a future failure or other form of unacceptable performance (e.g. 
excessive deformation, etc.). In general, consequences can also include human injuries or 
other less tangible things like legal liability or political consequences such as the loss of 
faith by the traveling public. In this dissertation research, all consequences are expressed 
in terms of monetary values to make the evaluations convenient.   
3.4.1 Mathematical Representation of Expected Monetary Value 
The expected monetary value (E) of a civil work can be expressed mathematically 
as 
  𝐸 = 𝐴 + 𝑃 ∙ 𝑋 + (1 − 𝑃) ∙ 𝑇 3.1 
where, 
 E = expected monetary value, 
A = initial cost of the civil work, 
P = the probability of failure, or unacceptable performance,  
 X = consequence costs associated with unacceptable performance, and  
T = costs associated with acceptable performance, or recurring 
maintenance cost. 
 
Since this work is focused on geotechnical infrastructure (piles, drilled shafts, 
embankments, etc.) that does not typically require recurring maintenance, the cost of 
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maintenance, T, in Equation 3.1 is considered negligible. The expression for expected 
monetary value can thus be simplified to become 
 
  𝐸 = 𝐴 + 𝑃 ∙ 𝑋  3.2 
Equation 3.2 involves three independent variables (A, P and X), which are interrelated as 
described in subsequent sections. 
3.4.2 Initial Costs 
The initial cost (A) and the probability of failure (P) are generally inversely 
related, meaning that the initial cost increases as the probability of failure decreases. This 
relation is generally intuitive.  For example, it is intuitive that costs for bridge 
foundations will generally increase as the size of the foundations are increased, but the 
probability of poor performance (settlement or collapse) will simultaneously decrease.  
Thus, there is a direct relation between initial costs and the probability of failure for 
bridge foundations and other geotechnical infrastructure.   
Specific functions relating the initial costs for geotechnical infrastructure and the 
probability of failure are established in Chapter 5.  These functions are taken to be of the 
form:  
  𝐴 = 𝑏 ∙ 𝐿𝑛𝑃 + 𝑑 3.3 
 
where, 
A = the initial cost of the geotechnical infrastructure, 
b = slope factor reflecting costs required to decrease the probability of failure, 
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P = probability of failure, and 
d = vertical intercept representing the required cost to produce P = 1.0.   
Values for variables b and d were established through probabilistic analyses for different 
specific type of geotechnical infrastructure, as described in Chapter 5.  
Substituting the expression for initial costs in Equation 3.3 into Equation 3.2 
produces an expression for the expected monetary value that is a function of the 
probability, P, the consequence cost, X, and two constants that describe the relation 
between initial costs and the probability of failure for specific types of geotechnical 
infrastructure: 
  𝐸 = (𝑏 ∙ 𝐿𝑛𝑃 + 𝑑) +  𝑃 ∙ 𝑋 3.4 
This function represents a surface in a space in which the axes are the expected monetary 
value (E), the probability (P) and the consequence (X), as shown in Figure 3.3.  The 
specific shape of the function in Figure 3.3 will depend on the specific coefficients (b and 
d) used that, in turn, depend on costs required to reduce the probability of failure for 
different types of geotechnical infrastructure (different types of foundations, slopes, 
walls, etc.).   
Figure 3.4 shows a plot of Equation 3.4 for different assumed values of X.  For a 
given consequence level, X, the expected monetary value from Equation 3.4 achieves a 
minimum value at some probability of failure, P.  This “optimum probability”, denoted 
Popt, varies with the magnitude of the consequences, X, and tends to decrease with 
increasing consequences.  The relation between the optimum probability of failure and 
the consequences is shown projected onto the X-P plane in Figure 3.3.  This plane is 
effectively an FN chart, and the projected relation between the optimum probability and 
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consequence level reflects economically optimized probabilities of failure for different 
consequence levels.   
 
 
Figure 3.3 Graphical representation of the relation between expected monetary value (E), 
probability of failure (P) and consequence cost (X). 
 
3.4.3 Consequence Costs 
As described in the previous section, the magnitude of the consequences, X, in 
Equation 3.4 influences the optimization of expected monetary value.  The range of 
potential consequence costs are also important because they establish appropriate ranges 
over which target probabilities of failure must be established for a particular limit state.  
While initial costs reflect only costs associated with the specific geotechnical 
infrastructure being considered (e.g. costs for the foundations or slopes alone), 
consequence costs may include costs for repair or replacement of other infrastructure 
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components that may be affected by unacceptable performance of slopes and foundations.  
For example, consequence costs associated with excessive settlement of bridge 
foundations will often include costs for repair of the entire bridge because excessive 
settlement is likely to cause damage to the entire bridge.  While consequence costs are 
often site specific, it is possible to develop generalizations for different types of 
geotechnical infrastructure and different limit states.  Analyses performed to develop 
generalized estimates for consequence costs are described in Chapter 5.   
 
Figure 3.4 Expected monetary value curves in which the optimum probability of failure 
(Popt) is shown to coincide with the minimum expected monetary value for different 
values of consequence X. 
3.4.4 Derivation of Optimum Probability Function and FN Curve 
The optimum probability of failure has been defined as the probability of failure that 
minimizes the expected monetary value.  An expression for the optimum probability of 
failure can therefore be derived by taking the derivative of the expected monetary value 
-50,000
-25,000
0
25,000
50,000
75,000
100,000
125,000
150,000
1E-07 1E-06 1E-05 1E-04 1E-03 1E-02 1E-01 1E+00 1E+01 1E+02
E
xp
e
ct
e
d
 m
o
n
e
ta
ry
 v
a
lu
e
 -
d
o
lla
rs
Probability of failure, P
Popt (X=1E4)
Popt (X=1E6)
Popt (X=1E7)
Popt (X=1E5)
Popt (X=1E8)
X=1E8
X=1E7
X=1E6
X=1E5
X=1E4
 37 
 
function (Equation 3.4) with respect to the probability of failure (P), and setting that 
derivative to be equal to zero: 
  
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑃
= 𝑏 ∙ 𝑃−1 + 0 + 𝑋 = 0 3.5 
 
Solving Equation 3.5 for the probability (P) leads to an expression for the optimum 
probability of failure (Popt): 
  𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 =
−𝑏
𝑋
 3.6 
Equation 3.6 states that the optimum probability of failure is dependent on the parameter 
b, which reflects costs required to reduce the probability of failure, and the consequence 
costs.  Chapters 5 and 6 describe the analyses performed to establish these values for 
different types of geotechnical infrastructure for the present work.   
 
3.5 Socially Acceptable Probabilities of Failure 
In Chapter 2, several studies and guidelines developed by agencies around the 
world to control and mitigate risk were presented.  These agencies commonly use FN 
charts to graphically represent regions of acceptable probabilities of failure.  The graphic 
shown in Figure 3.5 illustrates historical performance associated with several different 
activities or industries along with boundaries proposed to reflect acceptable probabilities 
of failure based on the presumption that historical performance has been acceptable.  The 
chart provides general guidance on accepted values for the annual probability of failure 
for construction and operation of a variety of traditional civil facilities and other large 
structures or projects (Baecher, 1982).  
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Figure 3.5. Relationship between annual probability of failure (F) and lives lost (N) 
(expressed in terms of $ lost and lives lost) for common civil facilities (Baecher and 
Christian, 2003). 
 
The most well-known FN boundaries were selected to identify common levels of 
acceptable probabilities of failure.  The FN chart in Figure 3.6 shows socially acceptable 
limits for the probability of failure established by the Australian National Committee on 
Large Dams (ANCOLD, 1999) and the Hong Kong Government Planning Department 
(HKGPD, 1994) superimposed on observations of the performance of traditional civil 
facilities from Baecher and Christian (2003) shown in Figure 3.5.  The figure shows good 
general agreement among what the different agencies have established as “socially 
acceptable” probabilities of failure and with the observed performance of civil facilities. 
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Figure 3.6. FN chart showing average annual risks posed by a variety of traditional civil 
facilities and other large structures along with several proposed boundaries reflecting 
acceptable probabilities of failure.  
 
The collection of boundaries reflecting socially acceptable probabilities of failure 
shown in Figure 3.6 was used, with some judgment, to establish recommended target 
probabilities of failure.  This was generally accomplished by plotting curves representing 
economically optimized probabilities of failure, established as described in this chapter, 
on the chart shown in Figure 3.6 and then employing judgment to arrive at final 
recommendations for the target probability of failure.  Results of analyses performed to 
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establish the recommended target probabilities of failure, and the considerations involved 
in establishing these probabilities of failure, are described in Chapter 6.   
 
3.6 Summary 
The transition from design following ASD methods to LRFD methods requires 
that target levels of reliability or target probabilities of failure be established.  The 
approach proposed in this chapter to establish target probabilities of failure includes the 
evaluation and comparison of probabilities of failure established from considerations of 
social acceptability and economic optimization.  Socially acceptable probabilities of 
failure established by several government agencies and other sources were used to 
represent social acceptability considerations.  Economically optimized probabilities are 
established by mathematically minimizing an expected monetary value function for 
bridge foundations and earth slopes.  Required inputs for the economic optimization of 
expected monetary value include information regarding the consequences associated with 
unacceptable performance and information regarding the costs required to reduce the 
probability of failure for bridge foundations and earth slopes.  Evaluations performed to 
quantify this information are presented in the following chapters.  
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4 CONSEQUENCE COSTS FOR BRIDGES 
4.1 Introduction 
As described in the previous chapter, consequence costs are one important input 
required for establishing appropriate target probabilities of failure based on economic 
considerations alone.  Unfortunately, consequence costs depend on factors that are often 
site specific so it is difficult to establish accurate consequence costs that will be broadly 
applicable for all bridges.  Nevertheless, reasonable ranges for consequence costs must be 
established so that the economic optimization described in Chapter 3 will be applicable 
over an appropriate range of consequences.  The approach adopted for this work was to 
assume that consequence costs are predominantly dependent on the initial cost for a 
bridge and the limit state being considered.  This approach was adopted because initial 
costs for bridges are frequently estimated during planning and design, and because these 
estimates can be related to consequence costs if empirical relations between the initial 
cost of bridges and the cost of failure or repair can be established.   
Cost information was collected from the literature and from Missouri Department 
of Transportation (MoDOT) personnel.  This information was then used to develop 
relationships between initial costs and consequence costs for bridges at four different 
limit states.  The limit states considered include one strength limit state that corresponds 
to complete collapse of a bridge and three serviceability limit states that correspond to 
different levels of damage as described in more detail in the following sections.   
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4.2 Consequence Costs for Strength Limit State 
When designing bridges under the conditions of safety and serviceability, it is 
required to consider two categories of limit states that are frequently referred to as service 
and strength limit states.  Strength limit states address the potential for complete 
structural or geotechnical failure of the bridge foundation while service limit states 
address the potential for loss of functionality without complete collapse.  This section 
addresses the methods used to develop cost relations for the strength limit state while cost 
relations for service limit states are addressed in Section 4.3.   
Cases where foundation failures have led to complete collapse of a bridge are 
extremely rare.  However, this is the specific condition being addressed when designing 
foundations for strength limit states.  In order to develop adequate costs associated with 
failure of bridges, a literature search was conducted to identify cases where bridges had 
collapsed, for any reason (not just due to foundation failure), and were subsequently 
replaced.  Sixteen such cases identified as part of this work are summarized in Table 4.1.  
The table includes the location, construction date, and initial cost for each bridge when 
this information could be established.  The table also includes the date each bridge 
collapsed and documented replacement costs for the respective bridges, again when this 
information could be established from the literature or other sources.  The present (2009) 
values of both the initial and replacement costs are also provided in the table.  The 
present value for these costs was computed using historical inflation rates 
(Inflationdata.com) over the period between initial construction or collapse and 
September 2009. 
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Seven of the cases shown in Table 4.1 include costs for initial construction and 
costs for replacement.  These cases were therefore used to establish a relationship 
between initial costs and replacement costs for bridges, as shown in Figure 4.1.  A power 
function relation was then fit through these data to serve as a mathematical function 
relating the consequence costs (replacement costs) to the initial cost for collapsed 
bridges.   
   
Figure 4.1.  Repair or replacement versus initial cost of collapsed bridges.  
 
4.3 Consequence Costs for Service Limit States 
Service limit states are intended to assure adequate service and performance of a 
structure.  In most cases, service limit states involve consideration of deflections for a 
structure to ensure that excessive deflections that would render the structure unusable are 
unlikely to occur.  For axial design of bridge foundations at service limit states, 
deflections resulting from foundation settlement are the predominant concern.   
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In attempting to establish acceptable probabilities of failure for serviceability 
limits based on economic considerations, it is important to recognize that different levels 
of settlement will produce different levels of damage, which in turn will produce different 
costs for repair.  Thus, an acceptable probability of failure for one level of settlement (or 
damage) may be completely unacceptable for another level of settlement.  In order to 
address this potential, three different levels of settlement/damage were considered in this 
study.  These three levels are referred to here as the “Service A”, “Service B”, and 
“Service C” limit states.   
The Service A limit was used to represent settlements that would induce minor, 
predominantly cosmetic damage such as minor cracking the bridge decks.  Duncan and 
Tan (1991) report that such damage tends to occur when the angular distortions reach a 
value of 0.0021.  The value of angular distortion was therefore used to compute 
settlements that are likely to induce minor damage. 
The Service B limit was used to represent settlements that would produce 
structural damage to a bridge.  Moulton et al. (1985) found that structural damage is 
likely to occur for continuous-span bridges when angular distortions exceed 0.004.  This 
value of angular distortion was therefore used to compute settlements that produce 
structural damage for the Service B limit. 
Finally, the Service C limit was used to represents settlements that are likely to 
produce overstress in components that ultimately could compromise the structural 
integrity of a bridge.  Moulton (1985) provides the following equation that was used to 
compute settlements that are likely to lead to overstress of multiple span bridge 
components: 
 
∆0𝑐
𝑓0(+)
  and   
∆0𝑐̅
𝑓0(−)
 
 or   
∆𝛼𝑐
𝑓𝛼(+)
  and   
∆𝛼𝑐̅
𝑓𝛼(−)
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Where: 
Δo and Δα are abutment and pier settlement respectively 
c and 𝑐̅ are the distance from the neutral axis to the outer fiber 
𝑓0(+) and 𝑓𝛼(+) are maximum positive settlement stresses 
𝑓0(−) and 𝑓𝛼(−) are maximum negative settlement stresses 
 
Using to Moulton's mathematical model, the levels of positive or negative stresses in the 
bridge structure were obtained by entering the span length, l and the number of spans, n 
in Figure 4.2 or in Figure 4.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Design aids for determining the maximum positive and negative stress 
increase caused by deferential settlement of the abutment (source: FHWA/RD-85/10). 
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Figure 4.3. Design aids for determining the maximum positive and negative stress 
increase caused by deferential settlement of the first interior support (source: FHWA/RD-
85/10). 
 
4.4 Development of Relations between Initial Costs and Consequence Costs 
Although information regarding the construction or initial costs of bridges is 
available in the literature, it is difficult to obtain information regarding the costs of repair. 
In order to obtain this information, a questionnaire was prepared for MoDOT, inquiring 
the action to be taken and the cost to repair specific hypothetical damages due to three 
selected levels of the differential settlement of the bridge abutments or piers. The three 
levels of settlement were selected based on the state limits A, B and C for minor, 
intermediate and sever settlements correspondently. Five continuous-span bridges of 
different size (between 35 and 220 feet) and type were selected for the questionnaire. The 
information obtained for these bridges is summarized in Table 4.2 along with the levels 
of damage produced by the differential settlements.  
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Table 4.2.  Presents bridge types, sizes and levels of settlement damage  
 
 
The initial costs of the selected bridges and the repair costs associated with the 
three levels of damage are summarized in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3. For the selected bridges, the table presents the year and cost of construction 
along with the repair costs for three levels of damage due to settlement. (Information 
provided by Missouri Department of Transportation-MoDOT, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Settlement that results in level of damage (inches)
Service A Service B Service C
(Deck Crack) (Structural) (Severe)
A3101 3 6 12
A6248 3 6 30
A5054 2.5 5 18
P
re
-s
tr
es
s 
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
A4824 2.5 4 18
C
o
n
cr
et
e 
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
A3390 2 4 8
Average 3 5 17
Service Limits
C
o
n
cr
et
e 
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s,
 s
te
el
 p
la
te
s
Bridge
Bridge
Year of 
Construction
Past     
Initial Cost
Present 
Initial Cost
Minor 
Damage
Interm. 
Damage
Severe 
Damage
A3390 1981 206,548 491,557 21,000 302,000 702,000
A4824 2005 758,505 840,181 22,000 512,000 1,522,000
A3101 1987 544,144 1,036,221 23,800 351,400 1,462,000
A6248 2001 4,259,949 5,206,524 32,000 542,000 5,702,000
A5054 1996 22,534,581 31,070,146 28,800 793,800 2,732,000
Settlement Repair Cost
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The information regarding initial costs and repair costs provided by MoDOT 
through the questionnaire were plotted in the log-log graphic shown in Figure 4.4. 
Relationships for initial and consequence (repair) costs were established for each level of 
damage as well as for the total bridge replacement scenario.  The relationships for all four 
levels of damage were expressed as mathematical functions generated by the add-on 
“Power function” of Excel ®. Good correlation was observed for all four levels of initial 
versus consequence costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Initial cost versus repair or replacement cost of bridges for three levels of 
damage and cost of bridge replacement. 
 
Detail information used in this chapter such as magnitudes of bridge settlement, 
questionnaire to MoDOT, bridge initial and repair costs MoDOT are summarized in 
tables presented in Apendix A.  
Minor damage
y = 6959x0.09
Interm. damage
y = 24688x0.20
Severe damage
y = 2698x0.45
Collapse
y = 0.74x1.13
1.E+04
1.E+05
1.E+06
1.E+07
1.E+08
1.E+09
1.E+04 1.E+05 1.E+06 1.E+07 1.E+08 1.E+09
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  (
X
)
Present initial cost, dollars (H)
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4.5 Summary 
According to previous chapters, target probabilities of failure for geotechnical 
infrastructure through economic considerations require the establishment of accurate 
relations between the initial costs of bridges and their costs for repair or replacement. 
From the literature and information obtained from MoDOT through a questionnaire, the 
costs of repair were found to be associated with the levels of damage produce by different 
magnitudes of bridge settlement. In the same way, the cost of bridge replacement was 
found to be associated with the initial or construction cost. Detail bridge information and 
consequence costs are presented in this chapter as well as plots showing a good 
correlation between the consequence costs and initial costs of the bridges for three levels 
of damage and collapse.  
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5 BRIDGE FOUNDATION ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3 a function was derived to calculate the optimum economic 
probability of failure for geotechnical infrastructure. The optimization (minimization) of 
this economic function requires establishing a relation between the probability of failure 
and the initial cost of the infrastructure. The analysis performed, including assumptions 
and considerations to develop equations that relate the probability of failure and the 
initial cost of bridge foundations and approach embankments is presented in this chapter. 
Sensitivity analyses for material unit costs, foundation geometry and material properties 
are also included. 
 
5.2  Probability of Failure-Cost Relations 
The probability of failure (Pf) or the probability of an unsatisfactory performance 
of a foundation decreases when increasing the certainty of soil and material parameter 
values, when increasing the quality and/or size of the foundation or when improving the 
design (type) of the foundation. All these options increase the cost of the foundation. The 
probability of failure-cost relation (Pf-cost) is a function that relates the probability of 
failure and the initial cost of the infrastructure. The slope of this function represents the 
cost required to decrease the probability of failure.   
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The term “probability of failure” is an event that does not necessarily only 
describes the chance of catastrophe. The behavior could constitute unsatisfactory 
performance but not catastrophic failure (Duncan et al., 1999). The Corps of Engineers 
uses the term “probability of unsatisfactory performance” to describe probability of 
failure (U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, 1998). In the previous chapter, three levels of 
service limits were established in relation to the damage produced by differential 
settlements of bridges. This chapter presents Pf-cost relations for service limits of bridge 
foundations and approach embankments as well as Pf-cost relations for strength limit 
state of bridge foundations. 
The probabilities of failure were established through reliability analyses. 
“Reliability” as used in reliability theory is “the probability of an event occurring”, or the 
probability of a “positive” outcome (Duncan et al., 1999). Reliability calculations 
provided a means to evaluate the combined effects of multiple design parameter 
uncertainties and variability. 
There are numerous methods of employing reliability theory to evaluate reliability 
of geotechnical infrastructure. The Taylor’s Series method is described in the following 
section. 
 
5.2.1 Taylor Series Method 
The Taylor series method is a procedure to compute the standard deviation and/or 
the coefficient of variation of the factors of safety for the strength (capacity) limit or 
service limits. The use of the method requires previous knowledge of the mean and 
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standard deviation of all parameters. The mean value of the factor of safety and the mean 
value of the probability of exceeding a service limit distribution are referred to in this 
method as the most likely value (FMLV). The most likely values of the factors of safety 
and the probabilities of exceeding a service limit were established using a deterministic 
method that consists of computing the mean value of the distribution using the mean 
value of all parameters.  
The standard deviation and coefficient of variation, (V) for both the factor of 
safety distribution and probability of exceeding a service limit distribution were obtained 
by calculating partial factors of safety or partial probability of exceeding a service limit 
by varying the values of the input parameters by the value of their standard deviations. 
Two partial factors of safety Fi+ and Fi- are obtained when increasing or decreasing the 
value of one parameter at a time by the value of their standard deviation while the other 
parameters were kept at their mean values. Considering F as the absolute difference 
between Fi
+
 and Fi
-
, the standard deviation (F) of the factor of safety was computed by 
applying Equation 5.1. 
𝜎𝐹 = √(
∆𝐹1
2
)
2
+ (
∆𝐹2
2
)
2
+ (
∆𝐹3
2
)
2
+ ⋯ + (
∆𝐹𝑛
2
)
2
 
Equation 5.1 
 
The coefficient of variation of the factor of safety (VF) was computed using the 
standard deviation (F) in Equation 5.2. 
𝑉𝐹 =
𝜎𝐹
𝐹𝑀𝐿𝑉
  
  Equation 5.2 
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Distributions of factors of safety values for strength limit and settlement values 
for service limits were developed using the mean and standard deviations values 
computed using Taylor’s Series method. These distributions were assumed to be 
lognormal. Using the distributions of factor of safety, the magnitude of the probability of 
failure was established by computing the area under the distribution curve (using 
cumulative functions) that was less than unity (1.0). The probability of exceeding a 
selected service limit was established by computing the area under the settlement value 
distribution curve larger than the service limit value.  
The initial costs of the foundations depend of the foundation type, there size and 
the cost of their materials. Most of the costs used for the materials were obtained from the 
Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) cost reports (reference, year).   
 
5.2.2 Probability of Failure – Cost Function Slope Factor  
The term “probability of failure” was defined as the probability of occurrence of a 
catastrophic event or unsatisfactory performance. At this stage of the dissertation, the 
“probability of failure” is used to describe the probability of the factor of safety being 
less than unity or the probability of exceeding a service limit.  
Probabilities of failure-cost curves were developed by plotting the probability and 
cost pairs on semi-log graphs. Probability values were plotted on the horizontal axis in a 
log scale while the costs were plotted on the vertical axis in an arithmetic scale. The 
probabilities of failure-cost functions were established using the trend line adds-on of 
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Excel® considering a logarithmic regression type. The functions reported by Excel ® are 
displayed on the graphs. 
The regression function reported by Excel ® has a linear form with the abscissa 
parameter (probability of failure) expressed in a natural log scale instead of a logarithmic 
scale. The independent constant, (d) which is an arithmetic value, represents the 
intersection of the function curve with a vertical line that passes through the probability 
of failure value equal to unity (Pf = 1.0). As shown in Equation 5.3, the term with the 
independent variable (probability of failure, P) is affected by a factor (b) which is not the 
true slope (m) of the linear function. The factor b is acting on the natural log value of the 
probability of failure instead of the logarithmic value of the probability of failure on a 
semi log graph.  
𝐴 = 𝑏 ∙ 𝐿𝑛(𝑃) + 𝑑      
Equation 5.3 
Where: 
A = the foundation initial cost, 
b = the slope factor,  
P = the probability of failure, and 
d = the vertical intercept at Pf = 1.0 
 
The value of the slope factor b can be expressed in terms of the true function 
slope, m. Consider the following linear equation in a semi log graph: 
 
     𝐴 = 𝑚 ∙ 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃) + 𝑑     Equation 5.4 
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Where: 
A = the foundation initial cost, 
m = the slope of the linear function,  
P = the probability of failure, and 
d = the vertical intercept at Pf = 1.0 
 
A relation between the slope factor b and the slope m can be established by 
comparing the terms with the independent variable P of Equation 5.3 and Equation 5.4. 
 
   𝑏 ∙ 𝐿𝑛(𝑃) = 𝑚 ∙ 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃) 
   𝑏 = 𝑚 ∙
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃)
𝐿𝑛(𝑃)
    
Equation 5.5 
 
The ratio between the log and natural log of P that multiplies the slope m can be 
simplified using the following known expression:   
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎(𝑋) =
𝐿𝑛(𝑋)
𝐿𝑛(𝑎)
   
   
Replacing the abscissa X with the probability (P) and replacing the general base 
value (a) of the logarithmic function to base 10, we have:  
 
  𝐿𝑜𝑔10(𝑃) =
𝐿𝑛(𝑃)
𝐿𝑛(10)
     Equation 5.6 
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Rearranging Equation 5.6, the expression for the ratio between the log and natural 
log of P is the following:   
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃)
𝐿𝑛(𝑃)
=
1
𝐿𝑛(10)
   
Equation 5.7 
 
The relation between the slope factor b and the true slope m is obtained by 
replacing the expression shown in Equation 5.7 into Equation 5.5. 
  𝑏 = 𝑚 ∙
1
𝐿𝑛(10)
   
or 
  𝑏 = 0.434 ∙ 𝑚  
 
Therefore quantitatively, the value of the slope factor b is about 40 percent of the 
value of the true slope of the probability of failure-cost function in a semi-log plane. As 
shown in the previous chapter, the optimum economic probability of failure can be 
expressed in terms of slope factor b or in terms of the true slope m of the function. 
Considering that Excel® reports the equation of the logarithmic trend using the slope 
factor b, for practical purposes, optimum probabilities of failure curves (economic 
curves) will be developed in the next chapter using the slope factors reported in this 
chapter.  
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5.2.3 Pile Groups 
Probably of failure-cost functions were developed for different types of bridge 
foundations. The results and considerations using pile foundation are presented in this 
section. 
5.2.3.1 Pile group conditions 
The relations between the probability of failure and the cost to reduce the 
probability of failure (probability of failure-cost functions) of pile groups were developed 
by defining failure as exceeding the capacity (strength limit state) and exceeding the 
service limits that were established in Chapter 4. Different magnitudes of load were used 
to develop the pile group probability of failure-cost function. The impact on the results 
caused by using different loads is presented in the sensitivity analysis section of this 
chapter. 
The probability of failure-cost function for piles groups was established 
considering the following assumptions: 
a) The mean working load was assumed to be 4000 kips. The coefficient of 
variation of the working load was based on the average dead and live loads 
standard deviations reported in the NCHRP 20-7/186 report. 
b) For a selected load, the probabilities of failure and the cost data points were 
obtained by varying the number of piles (between 3 and 10) in the group. 
c) Piles were designed to reach bedrock which was located 50 feet below the 
ground surface. 
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d) The selected size for the piles was HP10x57 with a cross sectional area of 
16.8 in
2
 and a yield strength of 50 ksi. The coefficient of variation of the yield 
strength was obtained from the NCHRP 20-7/186 report and the coefficient of 
variation of the pile cross sectional area (V = 0.06) was obtained from Schmidt 
et al. (2001). 
e) The elastic modulus of the piles was 29,000 ksi and its coefficient of variation 
(V = 0.06) was obtained from the NCHRP 20-7/186 report. 
f) The mean value of the elastic modulus for the rock 3,400 ksi was established 
by averaging pressuremeter tests results obtained from MoDOT’s research site 
at Warrensburg, MO. 
Although the cost of steel is normally reported in terms of dollars per unit weight, 
calculations for the total pile group costs were simplified by estimating pile costs based 
on pile length. The assumed cost of 70 dollars per foot length (FL) of pile was established 
considering the unit weight per foot length of the selected pile cross sectional area. The 
price was obtained from the Missouri Department of Transportation report: “Missouri 
Pay Item Report”, item N° 7061060, “Reinforcing steel bridges (Sanders, 2010). The 
average price reported was $1.17 per pound of reinforcing steel. The calculation to 
estimate the cost of HP10x57 piles per unit length is summarized as follows (price did 
not include installation): 
  1.17$/lb x 57lb/LF = 66.69 $/LF.  Rounded to 70.00 $/LF 
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An elevation view of the pile group scenario showing the assumed values is 
shown in Figure 5.1. A summary of all mean values and their coefficients of variation are 
presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 Elevation view of pile groups showing assumed values. 
 
Table 5.1. Design parameter values, standard deviations and c.o.v’s used to develop pile 
group probability of failure-costs functions. 
 
Rock
Soil
Pile cap
50 ft
Qw = 4000 kips
Pile group  HD10x57
Pile cost 70.00 $/FL
Standard Plus one Minus one
Deviation Std Dev Std Dev
Load kips 4,000 0.12 480 4,480 3,520
Pile cross sectional in
2
16.80 0.03 0.50 17.30 16.30
Steel elastic modulus ksi 29,000 0.06 1,740 30,740 27,260
Rock elastic modulus ksi 33,500 0.50 16,700 50,200 16,700
Parameter Unit Mean COV
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5.2.3.2  Pile Group Strength Limit State 
The probability of failure-cost function for pile group strength limit state 
(capacity) was developed using reliability theory. Factors of safety were calculated using 
Equation 5.8. Factors of safety distribution curves were developed with mean and 
standard deviation values calculated using the Taylor’s Series method. The values of 
probability of failure were calculated from the distribution curves while cost values were 
calculated based on MoDOT Pay Item reports. 
 
  𝐹. 𝑆. =
𝐹𝑦∙𝐴∙𝑛
𝑄𝑊
      
Equation 5.8 
Where, 
F.S. = the factor of safety 
Fy = the pile yield strength 
A = Cross sectional area of pile 
n = number of piles in the pile group, and 
Qw = working load. 
A factor of safety distribution curve was developed for each pile group size. The 
size of the pile groups depended on the number of piles in each group and they varied 
between 3 and 9 piles. Each factor of safety distribution curve generated a probability of 
failure point data (probability of the factor of safety being less than 1.0). Each pile group 
size was also associated with a cost depending on the number of piles in a group. Pairs of 
probability of failure and costs are plotted on a semi-log graph as shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2. Probability of failure-initial cost function for pile groups. 
 
Using Excel’s add-on function, a logarithmic type trend line and function 
equation were generated for the probability of failure-cost points. Figure 5.2 shows the 
probability of failure-cost function generated for pile group strength. The slope factor b 
of the function is -1,352. The negative sign of factor b means that the probability of 
failure decreases as the cost increases or, the cost increases as reliability increases. 
In some cases, the value of the slope factor b varies depending of the range of the 
probability of failure points considered. The interval of interest for this dissertation 
ranges between 1 a hundred (1x10
-2
) and 1 in a million (1x10
-6
) probability of failure. 
Factor of safety distribution curves were assumed to be log-normal. These distribution 
curves were plotted to visually compare their characteristics. Distribution curves, mean 
A = -1,352 ln(P) + 17,043
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values, standard deviations and probabilities of failure for pile groups of 5 and 7 piles are 
shown in Figure 5.3. The probability of failure or the area under the distribution curve 
less than 1.0, depends on the location mean value and the standard deviation (spread) of 
the distribution curve. The spread of the distribution depends on the variability or 
uncertainty of the design parameter variables. When comparing distribution curves, 
distributions with large means values (mean values shifted away from 1.0) were observed 
to have larger probabilities of failure if their spread is larger.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Factor of safety distribution curves for pile groups of 3and 5 piles. 
 
5.2.3.3 Pile Group Service Limit State 
The probability of failure-cost function for pile groups was developed for the 
probability of pile groups to exceed the three levels of service limit (settlement 
thresholds) established in Chapter 3. The probabilities of exceedance were obtained using 
reliability theory. Taylor’s Series method was used to calculate probabilities of failure 
Pf5 piles = 4.01E-01 m5 piles = 1.05
5 piles = 0.16
Pf7 piles = 6.40E-03 m7 piles = 1.47
7 piles = 0.22
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considering the combined effect of the variability of the input parameters. Pile group 
settlement includes the elastic settlement of the pile and the elastic settlement of the 
bedrock. The equation used to compute pile group service limits is shown in Equation 
5.9. 
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡 = 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑘    
Equation 5.9  
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑒 =
𝑄𝑊∙𝐿𝑃
𝐸𝑝∙𝐴
  
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑘 =
∆𝜎
𝐸𝑠
× 𝐿𝑃  
 
Where,  
∆𝜎 =
𝑄𝑊
[
(𝐵 + 𝐿𝑃)
3 + 0.5 ∙
(2𝐵 − 𝐿𝑃)
3 ] × [
(𝐿 + 𝐿𝑃)
3 + 0.5 ∙
(2𝐵 − 𝐿𝑃)
3 ]
 
and, 
Sett = settlement 
Qw = working load 
LP = pile length 
Es = Steel elastic modulus 
A = cross sectional area of pile 
 = increase in stress, and  
L and B = Dimensions of the cross section area of pile group.  
In this section the probability of exceeding the service limit is referred as the 
probability of failure. Each pile group generated a probability of failure point and an 
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associated cost. Probability of failure values were plotted against the cost value of pile 
groups on a semi-log graph. The probability of failure-cost function was generated using 
Excel’s ® add-on function for logarithmic regression.  
Figure 5.4 shows the probability of failure-cost function for the service limit A 
(approximately 3 inches to produce a distortion of 0.0021) while Figure 5.5 and Figure 
5.6 show the functions for service limits B and C (approximately 5 inches to produce a 
distortion of 0.004 and 17 inches to produce overstress) respectively. The slope factors 
(b-values) are valid for probabilities of failure that range between 1 in a hundred (1x10
-2
) 
to 1 in a million (1x10
-6
). The slope factors b for pile group service limits are -12,581, -
6,996 and -2,558 for limits A, B and C respectively.   
As the magnitudes of settlement, expressed as service limits, increases (from 3 
inches to 17 inches), the absolute value of the slope factor b decreases becoming more 
similar to the value of the strength limit. This can be observed by comparing the slope 
factor b of service limit C equal to -2,558 with the pile group strength slope factor b of -
1,352. This behavior can be explained by understanding that it is more expensive to 
decrease the probability of exceeding a small service limit (i.e. 3 inches) than it is to 
decrease the probability of a large service limit (i.e. 17 inches) or of strength limit 
(collapse).  
Distribution curves showing the probability of exceeding service limit A for 4 and 
9 piles are shown in Figure 5.7 The probability of exceeding the service limit drops from 
approximately 67 percent for a pile group of 4 piles to 16 percent for a pile group of 9 
piles. The improvement in reliability by the increase in the number of piles (or cost) for 
service limit A is reflected in Figure 5.4.  
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Figure 5.4. Probability of pile groups to exceed service limit A (about 3 inches or a 
distortion of 0.0021). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Probability of pile groups to exceed service limit B (5 inches or a distortion of 
0.004). 
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Figure 5.6. Probability of pile groups to exceed service limit C (about 17 inches). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Distribution curves of pile groups of 4 and 9 piles displaying the probability 
of exceeding service limit A. 
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5.2.4 Drilled Shafts 
The probability of failure-cost functions for drilled shafts were developed 
following a procedure similar to that of pile groups. This section presents the results and 
considerations for the design of probability of failure-cost functions for drilled shafts.  
 
5.2.4.1 Drilled Shafts conditions 
The probability of failure-cost functions for drilled shafts were developed for the 
probability of exceeding the capacity (strength limit state) of drilled shafts and for the 
probability of exceeding the service limits established in Chapter 4. Different magnitudes 
of load were used to develop the drilled shaft probability of failure-cost and service limit 
state functions. The impact on the function caused by using different loads is presented in 
the sensitivity analysis section of this chapter. 
The following are the assumptions considered to develop the probability of 
failure-cost function for drilled shafts:  
a) The mean working load was considered to be 4000 kips. The coefficient of 
variation of the working load is based on the average dead and live loads 
standard deviations reported in the NCHRP 20-7/186 report. 
b) The soil was considered homogeneous along the depth of the drilled shaft 
with a mean undrained shear strength, Su of 34,800 psf and a coefficient 
of variation, V=0.80. These values were obtained from MoDOT’s research 
site at Warrengsburg, Missouri. 
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c) Drilled shafts varied in length and diameter. Drilled shaft length varied 
between 10 and 110 ft while their diameters varied between 3 and 5ft.  
The cost of drilled shafts depended on the length, and the unit price of the shaft 
per diameter. Unit prices were obtained from Missouri Pay Item Report dated in 2010. 
The unit price per foot of 3 ft diameter drilled shafts was reported as: Pay Item 701-
11.04, and is 348.56 dollars per foot long. The unit price per foot of 4 ft diameter drilled 
shafts was reported as: Pay Item 701-11.06, and is 646.25 dollars per foot long.  The unit 
price per foot of 5 ft diameter drilled shafts was reported as: Pay Item 701-11.08, and is 
882.50 dollars per foot long.  
An elevation view of the drilled shafts showing the assumed values is shown in 
Figure 5.8. A summary of all mean values and their coefficients of variation are presented 
in Table 5.2. 
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Figure 5.8. Elevation view of a drilled shaft showing assumed values. 
 
 
 
Table 5.2. Design parameter values and standard deviations used to develop drilled shafts 
probability of failure-costs functions. 
 
 
Cap
Qw = 4000 kips
Shaft length: 10<LS<110 ft
Diameters: 3, 4, 5 ft
D = 4 ft then $650/FL
D = 5 ft then $880/FL
Shaft cost: D = 3 ft then $350/FL
Su = 34,800 psf
c.o.v. = 0.80
Standard Plus one Minus one
Deviation Std Dev Std Dev
Load kips 4,000 0.12 480 4,480 3,520
Undrain shear strength psf 34,800 0.80 27,840 62,640 6,960
Soil elastic modulus ksi 33,500 0.50 16,700 50,200 16,700
Parameter Unit Mean COV
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5.2.4.2 Drilled Shafts Strength Limit 
The probability of failure-cost function for drilled shaft strength limit state 
(capacity) was developed using reliability theory. Factors of safety were calculated using 
Equation 5.10. Factors of safety distribution curves were developed with mean and 
standard deviation values calculated using the Taylor’s Series method. The values of 
probability of failure were calculated from the distribution curves while cost values were 
calculated based on MoDOT Pay Item reports. 
 
𝐹. 𝑆. =
∝∙ 𝑆𝑢 ∙ 𝜋 ∙ 𝐷 ∙ 𝐿𝑆 + 9 ∙ 𝑆𝑢 ∙ 𝜋 ∙
𝐷
4
𝑄𝑊
 
       Equation 5.10 
Where, 
F.S. = the factor of safety 
α = skin resistance coefficient 
Su = undrained shear strength 
D = drilled shaft diameter 
LS = drilled shaft length 
Qw = working load. 
 
A factor of safety distribution curve is developed for each drilled shaft size. Each 
factor of safety distribution curve generated a probability of failure data point. Depending 
on the size, each drilled shaft was also associated with a cost. Pairs of probability of 
failure and costs are plotted on a semi-log graph as shown in Figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9. Probability of failure-cost function for drilled shafts.  
 
Using Excel’s add-on function, a logarithmic type trend line and function 
equation were generated for the probability of failure-cost points. The interval of interest 
for this dissertation ranges between 1 a hundred (1x10
-2
) and 1 in a million (1x10
-6
) 
probability of failure. Figure 5.9 shows the probability of failure-cost function generated 
for drilled shaft strength. The slope factor b of the function is -17,067. As mentioned 
before, the negative sign of the result means that the probability of failure decreases as 
the costs increases or as the reliability increases, cost increases. This slope is larger in 
magnitude that the slope generated for pile group (b = -1,352). This means that it is more 
expensive to reduce the probability of failure for drilled shafts than it is for pile groups. 
In the next chapter, optimum probabilities will be presented along with an interpretation 
of the different slope function values. 
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Factor of safety distribution curves were assumed to be log-normal distributions. 
These distribution curves were plotted to visually compare their characteristics. 
Distribution curves, mean values, standard deviations and probabilities of failure for 
drilled shafts of 3 and 5 feet diameter are shown in Figure 5.10. The probability of failure 
or the area of the distribution curve less than 1.0, depends on the mean value and the 
standard deviation (spread) of the distribution curve. The spread of the distribution 
depends of the variability or uncertainty of the design parameter variables. Same as with 
pile groups, when comparing distribution curves, distributions with a large means values 
were observed to often have larger probabilities of failure if their spread is larger.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Factor of safety distribution curves for 3 and 5 ft diameter drilled shafts. 
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5.2.4.3 Drilled Shafts Service Limit State 
The probability of failure-cost function for drilled shafts was developed for the 
probability of drilled shafts to exceed the 3 levels of service limit (settlements thresholds) 
established in Chapter 3. The probabilities of exceedence were obtained using reliability 
theory. Taylor’s Series method was used to calculate probabilities of failure considering 
the combined effect of the variability of the input parameters. Drilled shaft settlements 
were established based on side and tip elastic method proposed by Vesic (1977) in a 
homogenous medium. The equation used to compute drilled shaft service limits is shown 
in Equation 5.11. 
 
𝑆𝑒(𝑇𝑜𝑡) = 𝑆𝑒(1) + 𝑆𝑒(2) 
          Equation 5.11 
𝑆𝑒(1) =
𝑄𝑊𝑝 ∙ 𝐶𝑝
𝐷𝑝 ∙ 𝑞𝑝
 
    𝑆𝑒(2) =
𝑄𝑊𝑠
(𝐷𝑏∙𝜋)∙𝐿
×
𝐷𝑏
𝐸𝑆
× (1 − 𝜇2) × 𝐼𝑊𝑆 
 
Where,  
 QWp = load carried by the drilled shaft toe 
Cp = empirical coefficient dependent on the soil type and construction 
method, values range between 0.03 and 0.04. 
Dp = diameter of the drilled shaft  
qp = theoretical ultimate end bearing pressure 
 QWs = load carried by the drilled shaft side  
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Db = diameter of the drilled shaft 
ES = modulus of elasticity of the soil along the shaft side 
µ = Poisson’s ratio 
IWS = empirical influence factor (Vesic, 1977) 
 
The probability of exceeding the service limit is also referred in this dissertation 
as the probability of failure. Depending on the size, each drilled shaft generated a 
probability of failure point and an associated cost. Probabilities of failure are plotted 
against the cost value of drilled shafts on a semi-log graph. The probability of failure-cost 
function was generated using Excel’s add-on function for logarithmic regression.  
The probability of failure-cost function for the service limit A (approximately 3 
inches) is shown in Figure 5.11 while Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 show the functions for 
service limits B and C (approximately 5 and 17 inches) respectively. The slope factors b 
for drilled shafts service limits are -41,526, -34,873 and -23,703 for limits A, B and C 
respectively.  These slope factors values are valid for probabilities of failure that range 
between 1 in a hundred (1x10
-2
) to 1 in a million (1x10
-6
). 
Settlement distribution curves were developed for different drilled shaft sizes. The 
probabilities of 3 and 5 feet diameter drilled shafts to exceed limit A are show graphically 
in Figure 5.14. Results (approximately 6 and 3 percent chance respectively) show that is 
likely to exceed settlement limit A.  
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Figure 5.11. Probability of drilled shafts to exceed service limit A (about 3 inches). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Probability of drilled shafts to exceed service limit B (about 5 inches). 
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Figure 5.13. Probability of drilled shafts to exceed service limit C (about 17 inches). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Distribution curves of drilled shafts of 3 and 5 feet in diameter displaying 
the probability of exceeding service limit A. 
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5.2.5 Spread Footing 
The probably of failure-cost functions for spread footing was developed 
following a similar procedure to pile groups and drilled shafts. This section will 
present the results and considerations using spread footings. 
5.2.5.1 Spread Footing conditions 
The probability of failure-cost functions for spread footing were developed for the 
probability of exceeding the capacity (strength limit state) of spread footing and for the 
probability of exceeding the service limits established in Chapter 4. Different magnitudes 
of load were considered to develop the spread footing strength and service limit state 
functions. The impact on the function caused by using different loads is presented in the 
sensitivity analysis section of this chapter.  
The following are the assumptions considered to develop the probability of 
failure-cost functions for spread footings: 
a) The mean working load was considered to be 4000 kips. The coefficient of 
variation of the working load is based on the average dead and live loads 
standard deviations reported in the NCHRP 20-7/186 report. 
b) The soil was considered homogeneous along the depth with a mean 
undrained shear strength, Su of 34,800 psf and a coefficient of variation, V 
= 0.80. These values were obtained from MoDOT’s research site at 
Warrengsburg, Missouri. 
c) The bottoms of the spread footings were located at 3 feet below the 
surface (3 feet of excavation). 
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d) Spread foot was considered square in shape. Probability of failure analysis 
was performed by decreasing side dimensions, B by steps of 2 and 1 ft. 
e) Stress was assumed to decrease with depth. At a depth of 2B, the stress 
was considered to be 10% of the stress at the bottom of the footing.  
Spread footings were reinforced concrete structures. The cost of each spread 
footing varied depending on the volume. The total price per cubic foot included the price 
of concrete, steel and excavation. The prices were calculated from MoDOT unit pricing 
for foundations publish en February of 2010. The pay items considered were: Pay Item 
206-10.03 Class1 Excavation in Rock (130.00 $/yd3), Pay Item 206-20.03 Class-2 
Excavation in Rock (230.00 $/yd3), Pay Item 703-20.03 Class-B Concrete- Substructure 
(815.80 $/yd3) and Pay Item 706-10.60 Reinforcing Steel-Bridges (1.17 $/lb). 
Considering these prices, the price for excavation was 6.70 $/ft3 and 36.00 $/ft3 for 
reinforced concrete. 
 An elevation view of a spread footing showing the assumed values is 
shown in Figure 5.15. A summary of all mean values and coefficients of variation are 
presented in Table 5.3. 
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Figure 5.15. Elevation view of a spread footing showing assumed values. 
 
 
 
Table 5.3. Design parameter values and standard deviations used to develop spread 
footing probability of failure-costs functions. 
 
At 2B,  = 0.10 qall
Qw = 4000 kips
Soil
H = 2B (variable)
Spread footing 2.5 ft thick
Reinforced concrete cost 36.00 $/ft3
Standard Plus one Minus one
Deviation Std Dev Std Dev
Load kips 4,000 0.12 480 4,480 3,520
Undrain shear strength psf 34,800 0.80 27,840 62,640 6,960
Soil elastic modulus ksi 4,900 0.76 3,700 8,600 1,200
Bearing factor, Nc 6 0.05 0.30 6.30 5.70
Parameter Unit Mean COV
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5.2.5.2 Spread Footing Strength Limit 
The probability of failure-cost function for spread footing strength limit (capacity) 
was developed using reliability theory. Factors of safety were calculated using Equation 
5.12. Factors of safety distribution curves were developed with mean and standard 
deviation values calculated using the Taylor’s Series method. The values of probability of 
failure were calculated from the distribution curves while cost values were calculated 
based on MoDOT Pay Item reports. 
 
𝐹. 𝑆. = 𝑆𝑢 ∙ 𝑁𝑐 ∙
𝐴
𝑄𝑊
 
          Equation 5.12 
Where, 
 F.S. = factor of safety 
Su = undrained shear strength 
Nc = bearing capacity factor 
A = area of the spread footing 
QW = working load 
 
A factor of safety distribution curve was developed for each spread footing size. 
Each factor of safety distribution curve generated probability of failure data point. 
Depending on the size of the spread footing, each spread footing size was also associated 
with a cost. Pairs of probability of failure and costs are plotted on a semi-log graph as 
shown in Figure 5.16. 
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Figure 5.16. Probability of failure-cost function for spread footings. 
 
Using Excel’s add-on function, a logarithmic type trend line and function 
equation were generated for the probability of failure-cost points. The interval of interest 
for this dissertation ranges between 1 a hundred (1x10
-2
) and 1 in a million (1x10
-6
) 
probability of failure. Figure 5.16 shows the probability of failure-cost function generated 
for spread footing strength. The slope factor b of the function is -8,989. The negative sign 
of the result means that the probability of failure decreases as the cost increases or as the 
reliability increases, cost increases. This slope is larger in magnitude that the slope 
generated for pile group (b = -1,352). This means that it is more expensive to reduce the 
probability of failure for spread footings than it is for pile groups. In the next chapter, 
optimum probabilities will be presented along with an interpretation of the different slope 
function values. 
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Factor of safety distribution curves were assumed to be log-normal distributions. 
These distribution curves were plotted to visually compare their characteristics.  
Distribution curves, mean values, standard deviations and probabilities of failure for 
spread footing of 25 ft
2
 and 49 ft
2
 are shown in Figure 5.17. The probability of failure or 
the area of the distribution curve less than 1.0, depends on the mean value and the 
standard deviation (spread) of the distribution curve. The spread of the distribution 
depends of the variability or uncertainty of the design parameter variables. When 
comparing distribution curves, distributions with a large means values were observed to 
often have larger probabilities of failure if their spread was larger.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Factor of safety distribution curves for spread footings of 25 and 49 ft2 under 
4000 kip of load. 
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5.2.5.3 Spread Footing Service Limit State 
The probability of failure-cost function for spread footings was developed for the 
probability of spread footings to exceed the three levels of service limit (settlements 
thresholds) established in Chapter 3. The probabilities of exceedence were obtained using 
reliability theory. Taylor’s Series method was used to calculate probabilities of failure 
considering the combined effect of the variability of the input parameters. The equation 
used to compute spread footing service limits is shown in Equation 5.13. 
 
𝑆 =
𝑄𝑊 ∙ √𝐴
𝐸 ∙ 𝐴
 
         Equation 5.13 
Where, 
 S = spread footing elastic settlement 
QW = working load 
E = modulus of elasticity of the soil 
A = area of the spread footing 
 
The probability of exceeding the service limit is also referred as the 
probability of failure. Depending on the area, each spread footing generated a 
probability of failure point and an associated cost. Probability of failure values are 
plotted against the cost value of spread footings on a semi-log graph. The 
probability of failure-cost function was generated using Excel’s add-on function 
for logarithmic regression.  
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The probability of failure-cost function for the service limit A (approximately 3 
inches) is shown in Figure 5.18 while Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 show the functions for 
service limits B and C (approximately 5 and 17 inches) respectively. The slope factors b 
for spread footings service limits are -47,701, -31,373 and -17,277 for limits A, B and C 
respectively.  These slope factors values are valid for probabilities of failure that range 
between 1 in a hundred (1x10
-2
) to 1 in a million (1x10
-6
). 
Settlement distribution curves were developed for different spread footing sizes. 
The probabilities of 25 and 49 feet square to exceed limit A are show graphically in 
Figure 5.21. Results (approximately 6 and 3 percent chance respectively) show that is 
very likely to exceed settlement limit A.  
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Figure 5.18 Probability of spread footings to exceed service limit A (about 3 inches). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.19 Probability of spread footings to exceed service limit B (about 5 inches). 
A = -47,701 ln(P) - 216,992
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
1E-06 1E-05 1E-04 1E-03 1E-02 1E-01 1E+00
C
o
st
 s
p
re
a
d
 fo
o
tin
g
, 
(A
) 
Probability of exceeding 3 inches of settlement (P) 
A = -31,373 ln(P) - 159,092
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
1E-06 1E-05 1E-04 1E-03 1E-02 1E-01 1E+00
C
o
st
 s
p
re
a
d
 fo
o
tin
g
, 
(A
) 
Probability of exceeding 5 inches of settlement (P) 
 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.20 Probability of spread footings to exceed service limit C (about 17 inches). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.21 Distribution curves of spread footings of 25 and 49 ft
2
 displaying the 
probability of exceeding service limit A. 
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5.2.6 Approach Embankments 
The probably of failure-cost functions for embankment was developed following 
a similar procedure to pile groups and drilled shafts and spread footings. Results and 
considerations using embankments are presented in this section. 
5.2.6.1 Embankments conditions 
The probability of failure-cost functions for embankments were developed for the 
probability of exceeding the capacity (strength limit state) of embankment and for the 
probability of exceeding the service limits established in Chapter 3. Different magnitudes 
of load were considered to develop the embankment strength and service limit state 
functions. The impact on the function caused by using different loads is presented in the 
sensitivity analysis section of this chapter.  
The following are the assumptions considered to develop the probability of 
failure-cost functions for embankments: 
a. The mean working load was considered to be 4000 kips. The coefficient of 
variation of the working load is based on the average dead and live loads 
standard deviations reported in the NCHRP 20-7/186 report. 
b. To calculate settlement, embankments were assumed to be sited over 
homogeneous soils that have a mean undrained shear strength, Su of 
34,800 psf and a coefficient of variation, V = 0.80. These values were 
obtained from MoDOT’s research site at Warrensburg, Missouri. 
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c. The bridge superstructure was assumed not to rest on the embankment. 
The embankments were assumed to provide access to a bridge (bridge 
approach).  
d. For practical purposes, the geometry of the vertical cross sectional area of 
the embankment was assumed to be rectangular.  
e. It was assumed that 90 percent of the total ground settlement occurred 
before placing a roadway on the embankment.  
Design of the embankments considered fill and geofoam. The cost of geofoam 
was obtained online from Atlas EPS (http://www.falcongeofoam.com/).  The price is 
reported by the source is approximately 3.50 $/ft
3
. The price of the fill was obtained from 
MoDOT – Bridge Division. The price reported in 2010 ranged between 5 and 25 dollars 
per cubic foot or between 0.20$/ft3 and 1.00$/ft3 depending on the volume. The price per 
cubic yard assumed for soil fill was 0.50 dollars.  
The elevation view of an embankment showing the assumed values is shown in 
Figure 5.22. A summary of all mean values and their coefficients of variation are 
presented in Table 5.4. 
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Figure 5.22. Elevation view of an embankment showing assumed values. 
 
 
Table 5.4 Design parameter values and standard deviations used to develop embankment 
probability of failure-costs functions. 
 
 
 
3 ft Sand
Rock
Su =
Soil
H = 40 ft
4,000 psf
120 pcf
Soil fill cost 0.50 $/ft3
Geofoam cost 3.50 $/ft3
g geofoam = 1.5 pcf
g fill =
Embankment H=40 ft 
Standard Plus one Minus one
Deviation Std Dev Std Dev
Undrained shear strgth psf 4,000 0.80 3,200 7,200 800
Geofoam unit weight pcf 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5
Fill unit weight pcf 120 0.05 6 126 114
Clay void ratio, eo 0.85 0.12 0.10 0.95 0.75
Compression index, Cc 0.23 0.31 0.07 0.30 0.16
Parameter Unit Mean COV
yrd3 
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5.2.6.2 Embankments Strength Limit 
The probability of failure-cost function for embankment strength (capacity) limit 
was developed using reliability theory. Factors of safety were calculated using Equation 
5.14. Factors of safety distribution curves were developed with mean and standard 
deviation values calculated using the Taylor’s Series method. The values of probability of 
failure were calculated from the distribution curves while cost values were calculated 
based on MoDOT Pay Item reports.  
𝐹. 𝑆. =
5 ∙ 𝑆𝑢
𝛾𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙 ∙ (𝐻𝑠𝑜𝑖𝑙 − 𝐻𝑔𝑒𝑜) + 𝛾𝑔𝑒𝑜 ∙ 𝐻𝑔𝑒𝑜
 
          Equation 5.14 
Where, 
F.S. = the factor of safety 
Su = undrained shear strength 
gfill = unit weight of fill 
Hsoil = height (thickness) of soil fill 
Hgeo = height (thickness) of geofoam 
ggeo = unit weight of geofoam 
A factor of safety distribution curve is developed for embankments with different 
ratios of fill and geofoam height. Each factor of safety distribution curve generated a 
probability of failure point data (probability of the factor of safety being less than 1.0). 
Depending on the amount of geofoam in the embankment, each ratio of fill-geofoam in 
the embankments was also associated with a cost. Pairs of probability of failure and costs 
are plotted on a semi-log graph as shown in Figure 5.23. 
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Figure 5.23 Probability of failure-cost function for embankments. 
 
Using Excel’s add-on function, a logarithmic type trend line and function 
equation were generated for the probability of failure-cost points. The interval of interest 
for this dissertation ranges between 1 a hundred (1x10
-2
) and 1 in a million (1x10
-6
) 
probability of failure. Figure 5.16 shows the probability of failure-cost function generated 
for spread footing strength. The slope factor b of the function is -412. The negative sign 
of the result means that the probability of failure decreases as the cost increases or as the 
reliability increases, cost increases. This slope is smaller in magnitude that the slope 
generated for pile group (b = -1,352). This means that it is less expensive to reduce the 
probability of failure for approach embankments than it is for pile groups. In the next 
chapter, optimum probabilities will be presented along with an interpretation of the 
different function slope values. 
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Factor of safety distribution curves were assumed to be log-normal distributions. 
These distribution curves were plotted to visually compare their characteristics.  
Distribution curves, mean values, standard deviations and probabilities of failure for 
approach embankments of 20 ft and 24 ft high are shown in Figure 5.24. The probability 
of failure or the area of the distribution curve less than 1.0, depends on the mean value 
and the standard deviation (spread) of the distribution curve. The spread of the 
distribution depends of the variability or uncertainty of the design parameter variables. 
When comparing distribution curves, distributions with a large means values were 
observed to often have larger probabilities of failure if their spread was larger.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.24 Factor of safety distribution curves for embankments. Geofoam heights of 20 
& 24 ft. 
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5.2.6.3 Embankments Service Limit State 
The probability of failure-cost function for embankments was developed for the 
probability of embankments to exceed the 3 levels of service limit (settlements 
thresholds) established in Chapter 4. The probabilities of exceedence were obtained using 
reliability theory. Taylor’s Series method was used to calculate probabilities of failure 
considering the combined effect of the variability of the input parameters.  
The settlement of an embankment was assumed to have two components. The 
first component of settlement is due to the consolidation of the soil layer beneath the 
embankment (i.e. the foundation) and the second component of settlement due to the 
deformation of the fill of the embankment itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.25 Accumulated vertical movement (MH, CH soils) 4 year monitoring period 
(Vicente et al., 1994). 
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The deformation of the fill of the embankment was assumed to be 1 percent of the 
height of the fill. Vertical surface measurements increase with increasing fill thickness 
(Vicente et al., 1994). Figure 5.25 shows a plot of surface vertical movement data versus 
compacted fill thickness monitored in southern California where the predominant soil 
was elastic silts (MH), fat clay (CH) and clayey sands (SC). The equation used to 
compute the settlement of the embankment for the service limits is shown in Equation 
5.15. 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡10%𝑇𝑜𝑡 = 0.10 × [𝐶𝑐 ∙
𝐻𝑠𝑜𝑖𝑙
1 + 𝑒𝑜
∙ 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
𝜎𝑜,𝑠𝑜𝑖𝑙 + ∆𝜎𝑠𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝜎𝑜,𝑠𝑜𝑖𝑙
) + 0.01 ∙ (𝐻 − 𝐻𝑔𝑒𝑜)] 
         Equation 5.15 
Where, 
Sett10%Tot = ten percent of total settlement 
CC = compression index 
Hsoil = height (thickness) of soil fill 
eo = initial void ratio 
o,soil = initial stress 
soil = change in stress 
H = height of embankment 
Hgeo = height (thickness) of geofoam 
 
The probability of exceeding the service limit was also referred as the probability 
of failure. Depending on the ratio between the soil fill and the geofoam, each 
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embankment design generated a probability of failure point and an associated cost. 
Probability of failure values are plotted against the cost value of embankments on a semi-
log graph. The probability of failure-cost function was generated using Excel’s add-on 
function for logarithmic regression. 
The probability of failure-cost function for the service limit A (approximately 3 
inches) is shown in Figure 4.36 while Figure 5.27 and Figure 5.28  show the functions for 
service limits B and C (approximately 5 and 17 inches) respectively. The slope factors b 
for embankments service limits are -120, -256 and -491 for limits A, B and C 
respectively.  These slope factors values are valid for probabilities of failure that range 
between 1 in a hundred (1x10
-2
) to 1 in a million (1x10
-6
). 
Settlement distribution curves were developed for different soil fill and geofoam 
ratios. The probabilities of 30 and 31 feet of geofoam fill to exceed limit A are show 
graphically in Figure 5.29. Results (approximately 1 and 0.7 percent chance respectively) 
show that is likely to exceed settlement limit A.  
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Figure 5.26 Probability of embankments to exceed service limit A (about 3 inches). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.27 Probability of spread footings to exceed service limit B (about 5 inches). 
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Figure 5.28 Probability of embankments to exceed service limit C (about 17 inches). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.29 Settlement distribution curves for embankments displaying the probability of 
30 and 31 ft of geofoam fill to exceed service limit A. 
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5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In previous sections of this chapter, the probability of failure-cost functions were 
developed for bridge foundations (pile groups, drilled shafts and spread footings) and for 
embankments. These functions were developed considering assumed values for the 
design parameters. The impact (sensitivity) on the probability of failure-cost functions 
and the factor of safety distribution curves when varying the assumed bridge foundation 
design parameter values, are addressed in this section.  
5.3.1 Pile Groups - Sensitivity Analysis 
For pile groups as for all bridge foundation types analyzed for this dissertation, 
values of material properties and their variability were obtained from the literature. The 
assumed structure costs were obtained from the Missouri Department of Transportation 
(MoDOT) pay reports. Changes were observed in the probability of failure-cost functions 
when varying the values of the variables. These changes are quantified and commented 
on in the following sub-sections. 
The change in cost per length of pile group was observed to change the 
probability of failure-cost function proportionally. The change in the function was 
quantified through the change in value of the slope factor b. While the intrinsic values of 
the probabilities of failure value were not affected by the change in cost, the ordinate of 
the plot (cost) of each point that composes the function varied. An example is shown in 
Figure 5.30 where the slope factor b is reduced by 50 percent its value when decreasing 
the cost (price) per pile length by 50 percent. The abscissas are the same for both 
functions. 
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Figure 5.30 The cost to reduce the probability of failure of pile groups decreases to 50 
percent when reducing the cost of pile in 50 percent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.31 Sensitivity of the probability of failure-cost function for pile group strength 
limit state when varying the load from 4000 kips (top) to 3000 and 2000 kips (bottom).  
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The unit price per pile length is provided by MoDOT and does not vary 
significantly. If the cost were to change dramatically, the change in the value of the slope 
factor b from -1352 to -676 will still produce a small change in the log-log scaled FN 
chart. This change is small compared to the engineering precision or judgment when 
establishing the target probability of failure and to the differences generated when 
comparing to the results of other foundation type functions.  
Similar changes in probability of failure-cost function are observed when 
changing the loads (dead and live loads). Assuming dramatic changes in the applied 
loads, these will produce proportional changes in the probability of failure-cost function. 
Examples of changes in the magnitude of the slope factors b for different loads are shown 
in Figure 5.31. In this figure, the ordinates of the points remain constant because there is 
no change in costs while the abscissas (probabilities of failure) change due to the change 
in load. Similar to the sensitivity to costs, it is unlikely to have large changes in the 
applied loads. Is design loads were to increase, these would require to redesign the 
foundations and therefore vary completely the probability of failure-cost function. 
Therefore it is not likely to generate large changes in the slope factor b. But if the loads 
were to change significantly, the changes in the value of the slope factor b (i.e. from -
1352 to -704) would produce a small change in the log-log scaled FN chart compared 
with the engineering precision or judgment when establishing the target probability of 
failure. The change in probability of failure when changing the load can be also observed 
by examining the factor of safety distribution. When decreasing the load, the mean value 
of the factor of safety increases displacing the distribution away from 1.0 (F.S. = 1.0). 
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Therefore probability of failure, which is defined as the area under the distribution curve 
to the left of F.S. = 1.0, decreases. This displacement is shown in Figure 5.32. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.32 A increase in mean and spread of the pile group factor of safety distribution 
(compare Figure 5.3) when decreasing load from 4000 kips to 3000 kips.    
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to this parameter than it is to costs and loads. Although the coefficient of variation of the 
load decreased to 50 percent, slope factor b decreases only to about 70 percent.  
The spread of the factor of safety distribution is narrowed when decreasing the load 
coefficient of variation. This change can be observed by comparing Figure 5.34 with 
Figure 5.3. A more narrow distribution will decrease the area under the curve that is left 
to the factor of safety of 1.0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.33 Sensitivity of the probability of failure-cost function for pile group strength 
limit state when varying the c.o.v. of the load from 0.12 (top) to 0.06 (bottom).  
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Figure 5.34 Decrease in mean and spread of the pile group factor of safety distribution 
(compare Figure 5.3) when decreasing the c.o.v. of the load from 0.12 to 0.06. 
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5.3.2  Drilled Shafts - Sensitivity Analysis 
Similar to pile groups, the cost per size of drilled shaft was observed to change the 
probability of failure-cost function proportionally. The change in the function was 
quantified through the change in value of the slope factor b. While the intrinsic values of 
the probabilities of failure value were not affected by the change in cost, the ordinate 
(cost) of each point that composes the function varied. An example is shown in Figure 
5.35 where the slope factor b is reduced by 50 percent its value when decreasing the cost 
(price) per drilled shaft length by 50 percent. The abscissas are the same for the 
corresponding points of both functions. 
Considering that drilled shaft prices were obtained from MoDOT’s pay reports, 
these prices are considered reliable and are not expected to vary significantly.  If the cost 
were to change significantly, the changes of the slope factor b reported in Figure 5.35 
from -17,067 to -8,533 will produce a small change in the log-log scaled FN chart. This 
change is small compared to the engineering precision or judgment when establishing the 
target probability of failure and to the differences generated when comparing to the 
results of other foundation type functions.  
The changes generated in the probability function due to the change in loads 
(dead and live loads) are similar to the changes produced by costs. Figure 5.36 shows the 
change in function due to the decreases in loads from 4000 kips to 3000 kips and to 2000 
kips. In this figure, the ordinates (of the points) remain constant because there is no 
change in costs while the abscissas (probability of failure) change due to the change in 
load.  
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Figure 5.35 Decrease in slope of drilled shaft probability of strength failure function 
when reducing the cost by 50 percent (bottom). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.36 Change in the probability of failure-cost function for drilled shafts strength 
limit state when varying the load from 4000 kips (top) to 3000 and 2000 kips (bottom). 
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Loads are not expected to change dramatically without changing the foundation 
design and therefore the slope factor b, although sensitive to the changes in load, is not 
expected to vary significantly.  But if the loads were to change dramatically, the changes 
in the value of the slope factor b (i.e. from -17,067 to -8,533) would produce a small 
change in the log-log scaled FN chart.  
The change in probability of failure when changing the load can be also observed 
by examining the factor of safety distribution. When decreasing the load, the mean value 
of the factor of safety increases displacing the distribution away from 1.0 (F.S. = 1.0). 
Therefore probability of failure, which is defined as the area under the distribution curve 
to the left of F.S. = 1.0, decreases. This displacement is shown in Figure 5.37 by 
comparing to Figure 5.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.37 Increase in mean and spread of the drilled shaft factor of safety distribution 
(compare Figure 5.10) when decreasing load from 4000 kips to 3000 kips. 
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Decreasing the variability of the load (load coefficient of variation), decreases the 
probability of failure, changes the function and therefore decreases the value of the slope 
factor b. For pile groups, when decreasing the values of the probabilities of failure, the 
points that defined the function were displaced to lower probability magnitudes (decrease 
in abscissas). This change was not noticeable for drilled shafts as displayed in Figure 
5.38. In this figure, although the coefficient of variation of the load decreased from 0.12 
to 0.06 (50 percent decrease), there was a small change in the slope factors (from -17,067 
to -16,867). To verify the sensitivity of the drilled shaft to the variability of loads, another 
analysis was performed considering a mean load of 1000 kips instead of 4000 kips. The 
results shown in Figure 5.39 confirm that probabilities of failure-cost functions for drilled 
shafts are not sensitive to the variability of the loads. 
The small variability of the drilled shaft probabilities of failure-cost functions 
were also confirmed by comparing the distribution curves generated with different 
variability of loads. Figure 5.40 shows the distribution curves for 3 and 5 foot diameter 
drilled shafts for a load variability of 0.06. These curves are very similar to the 
distribution curves generated for the load variability of 0.12 shown in Figure 5.10.  
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Figure 5.38 Sensitivity of the probability of failure-cost function for drilled shafts 
strength limit state when varying the c.o.v. of the load from 0.12 (top) to 0.06 (bottom). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.39 Change in the probability of failure-cost function due to change in load 
coefficient of variation when load is reduces from 4000 kips to 1000 kips. 
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Figure 5.40 Increase in spread of the drilled shafts factor of safety distribution (compare 
Figure 5.10) when decreasing load c.o.v. from 0.12 to 0.06. 
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assumed cost. It is important to notice that in this figure, the abscissas are the same for 
the corresponding points of both functions. 
Although the slope factors b changes significantly in Figure 5.41, the cost per area 
of a spread footing is not expected to suffer major changes as the cost was established 
from MoDOT’s pay reports. If the cost were to change by 50 percent, the difference 
between slope factor b values (approximately b=-4,500) would generate still a minor 
change in the target reliability (economic curves) reported in the log-log scales FN chart 
as will be seen in the next chapter. Furthermore, this change will be within the range of 
curves generated by the different types of bridge foundations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.41 Decrease in slope of the spread footing probability of strength failure 
function when reducing the cost to 50 percent (bottom). 
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Figure 5.42 Change in the probability of failure-cost function for spread footing strength 
limit state when varying the load from 4000 kips (top) to 3000 and 2000 kips (bottom). 
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the values of the mean factors of safety of the distribution drift the distributions away 
from the factor of safety of 1.0 decreasing the probability of failure.  
The variability of the loads does not affect significantly the probability of failure-
cost function of spread footings. An example of the sensitivity of the function to the 
variability of the loads is shown in Figure 5.44. The change in variability of the load 
changes the spread of the factor of safety distribution. Decreasing the variability from 
0.12 to 0.06 decreases the factor of safety distribution curves displayed in Figure 5.45. 
This change is better observed when comparing the distribution curves of Figure 5.45 
with the distribution curves of Figure 5.17.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.43 Decrease in mean and spread of the spread footing factor of safety 
distribution (compare Figure 5.17) when decreasing load from 4000 kips to 3000 kips. 
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Figure 5.44 Probability of failure-cost function for spread footing strength limit when 
varying the load (4000 to 2000 kips) c.o.v. of the load from 0.12 (top) to 0.06 (bottom). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.45 Decrease in mean and spread of the spread footing factor of safety 
distribution (compare Figure 5.17) when decreasing load c.o.v. from 0.12 to 0.06 
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5.3.4 Approach Embankments - Sensitivity Analysis 
The results of the cost sensitivity analysis performed to embankments were 
similar to the analyses performed for bridge foundations in which by changing the cost, 
the probability of failure-cost function varied directly and in the same proportion as the 
change in cost. The changes occur by vertically relocating the points that define the 
probability of failure-cost function to a location in agreement with the change in cost 
(Figure 5.36). In the example shown in Figure 5.46, the relocation of the points that 
define the original function occurred by reducing the values of the ordinates (cost) by 50 
percent of its original value.  
The change in slope factor b reported in Figure 5.46 (b = -206) produces a small 
change in the location of the economic curve in the log-log scaled FN chart. Regardless 
of the magnitude of change, this slope factor b value produces an economic curve that 
falls on a conservative region of the chart as will be shown in Chapter 5. 
Another sensitivity analysis was performed considering the variable undrained 
shear strength, Su. The results of this analysis show that the probability of failure-cost 
function is sensitive to this variable as it causes direct changes to the function slope 
although the change is not in the same proportion as the change in the variable. In Figure 
5.47, when decreasing the strength of the soil (undrained shear strength) from 4000 psf to 
2000 psf, the points that define the new function are shifted to larger probabilities of 
failure values (increase in the abscissas). In this case, although the strength of the soil 
decreased by 50 percent, the change in the slope factor b value is small and this will 
produce a very small change in the location of the economic curve in the log-log scaled 
FN chart.  
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Figure 5.46 Decrease in slope of the embankment probability of strength failure function 
when reducing the cost by 50 percent (bottom) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.47 Change in the probability of failure-cost function for spread footing strength 
limit state when varying the load from 4000 psf (left) to 2000 psf (right). 
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The increase in the probability of failure is also displayed in Figure 5.48 where 
the mean values of the distribution curves are displaced to lower factor of safety values. 
This displacement is observed when comparing Figure 5.48 with Figure 5.24 in which the 
undrained shear strength of the soil is 4000 psf and 2000 psf respectively. The 
displacement of the distribution towards lower values of factor of safety increases the 
areas under the curves that are lower than the limit factor of safety of 1.0 (F.S.=1.0) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.48 Decrease in mean and spread of the embankment factor of safety distribution 
(compare Figure 5.24) when decreasing load from 4000 kips to 3000 kips 
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5.4 Summary 
The establishment of the target probabilities of failure for the design of 
geotechnical infrastructures from an economic perspective requires identifying and 
understanding the relation (function) between the probability of failure of the 
infrastructure and its cost. In this chapter, several functions were developed and presented 
graphically for pile groups, drilled shafts, spread footings and approach embankments. 
The relationship between the probabilities of failure and the costs were 
established with the use of reliability analyses (Taylor Series Method). 
The slope factor b of the probability of failure-cost function is described in this 
chapter as an essential parameter to define, understand and compare functions. This 
parameter is defined as the required cost to decrease the probability of failure by one 
order of magnitude.  
The slope factor b values established in this chapter for bridge foundations and 
embankments were developed for the probability of exceeding the capacity (strength 
limit state) and for the probability of exceeding the service limits established in Chapter 
3. A summary of the slope factor b values are presented in Table 5.5 while the overall 
slope factors b are presented in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.5 Slope factors b for foundations and embankments considering strength and 
service limits  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 Upper and lower range values of the slope factors b for bridge foundations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification Piles Shafts Footing Embankments
Strength -1,352 -17,067 -8,989 -412
Serv A -12,581 -41,526 -47,701 -120
Serv B -6,996 -34,873 -31,373 -256
Serv C -2,553 -23,703 -17,277 -491
Classification
Strength -1,352 -17,067
Serv A -12,581 -41,526
Serv B -6,996 -34,873
Serv C -2,553 -23,703
Foundation Range
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Sensitivity analysis was performed on the probability of failure-cost function. The 
changes in the function were quantified through the change in the values of the slope 
factor b. This chapter presented graphs and comments of the impact on the function 
produced by the changes in the values of parameters such as costs, loads and soil 
strength. 
Results of the sensitivity analysis showed that the impact due to changes of 
parameter values on the function were consistent for all foundation types and 
embankments. The sensitivity analyses showed that (1) the changes in the log-log scaled 
FN chart were small compared to the engineering precision or judgment when 
establishing the target probability of failure and (2) the changes in the slope factors b fall 
within the overall range of economic curves generated by the different foundation types. 
The results of the sensitivity analyses for foundations are summarized in Table 5.7 while 
Table 5.8 summarizes results of the sensitivity analysis performed on embankments.  
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Table 5.7 Change in foundation slope factor b values due to sensitivity analysis when 
reducing costs, loads and c.o.v. of design parameters by 50 percent of their original value  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.8 Change in embankment slope factor b values due to sensitivity analysis when 
reducing costs, and soil strength parameters by 50 percent of their original value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable
Cost -412 -206
Su -412 -544
Embankments
Variable
Cost -1,352 -676 -17,067 -8,533 -8,989 -4,494
Load -1,352 -704 -17,067 -12,993 -8,989 -4,813
Load COV -1,352 -934 -17,067 -16,867 -8,989 -8,879
Pile Groups Drilled Shafts Spread Footing
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6 DEVELOPMENT, ANALYSIS AND CALIBRATION OF 
ECONOMIC CURVES 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the FN charts are developed with information obtained from the 
probability of failure-cost functions developed in Chapter 5. The FN economic curves 
that identify the optimum probability of failure for the design of bridge foundations and 
approach embankments from an economic perspective are compared with the socially 
acceptable risk. Comments on the results along with recommended target probability of 
failure (or target reliabilities) are presented in accompanying tables.  
 
6.2 FN Charts and Economic Curves 
In the previous chapter, functions that relate the probability of failure and the cost 
of bridge foundations and approach embankments were established with the use of 
probability analysis. These functions along with the expected monetary value concept 
allowed developing an equation to calculate the optimum probabilities of failure as a 
function of the cost of failure (consequence costs) of bridges and approach embankments 
(Figure 3.6). Points of optimum probabilities and their respective consequence cost are to 
be plotted on FN charts. 
FN charts are graphical representations of socially acceptability for the loss of 
lives. The FN curves proposed by world government safety agencies on FN charts are 
boundaries that define regions or levels of risk depending on the acceptability of society. 
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They are not curves that define the economically optimum acceptability of risk. However, 
it is in this chart of regions of social acceptability that the optimum economical curves 
are plotted. These optimal economic curves do not define regions of economic 
acceptability. These curves represent a family of points of probabilities that are 
economically optimum for different levels of consequence. Considering that economic 
curves are dependent on the same parameters as socially acceptability (i.e. consequence 
(X) and probability of failure (P)), they will be plotted on FN charts overlapping the 
socially acceptance regions.  
6.2.1 Pile Group FN Charts 
The FN charts for pile groups were developed for the probability of exceeding the 
capacity (strength limit state) and for the probability of exceeding the service limits 
established in Chapter 4. These results were developed considering the assumptions listed 
the section 5.2.3.1.  
The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.1 for strength limit is located near the 
ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundary for acceptable risk acceptance. The curve falls 
within the region of social acceptability for civil works defined by Baecher and Christian 
(2003). The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.2 for service limit A (3-inch 
settlement) is located above the ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundaries were risk is 
unacceptable. However, the curve still falls within the region of civil work acceptability. 
The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.3 for service limit B (5-inch settlement) is also 
located above but closer to the ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundaries were risk is 
unacceptable. This curve also falls within the region of civil work acceptably.  
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Figure 6.1 FN chart for pile group strength limit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 FN chart for pile group service limit A. 
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Figure 6.3 FN chart for pile group service limit B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 FN chart for pile group service limit C. 
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The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.4 for service limit C (17-inch 
settlement) is also located above but closer to the service limits of less settlement to the 
ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundaries were risk is unacceptable. This curve also falls 
within the region of civil work acceptably. 
As the magnitudes of settlement of service limits increase, the location of their 
economic curves approaches the location of the economic curve for strength limit or 
collapse. Therefore as the magnitudes of settlement of a bridge increase, the target 
probability of failure level approaches that of collapse. 
 
6.2.2 Drilled Shafts FN Charts 
The FN charts for drilled shafts were developed for the probability of exceeding 
the capacity (strength limit state) and for the probability of exceeding the service limits 
established in Chapter 4. These results were developed considering the assumptions listed 
the section 5.2.4.1.  
The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.5 for strength limit is located above the 
ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundary for risk acceptance. The curve falls within the 
region of social acceptability for civil works. The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.6 
for service limit A (3-inch settlement) is located above the ANCOLD and Hong Kong 
boundaries were risk is socially unacceptable. However, the curve still falls within the 
region of civil work acceptability. The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.7 for service 
limit B (5-inch settlement) is also located above but closer to the strength limit state 
economic curve. This curve also falls within the region of civil work acceptably.  
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Figure 6.5 FN chart for drilled shaft strength limit state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 FN chart for drilled shaft service limit A. 
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Figure 6.7 FN chart for drilled shaft service limit B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 FN chart for drilled shaft service limit C. 
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The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.8 for service limit C (17-inch 
settlement) is also located above but closer to the service limits of less settlement to the 
ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundaries. This curve also falls within the region of civil 
work acceptably. Therefore, as the magnitudes of settlement of a bridge increase, the 
target probability of failure level approaches that of collapse. 
In general, the economic curves of drilled shafts are located at higher risk levels 
than pile group economic curves. Drilled shafts slope factors b are larger in magnitude 
than pile group factors therefore it is more costly to decrease the probability of failure of 
drilled shafts. The target level of probability of failure for the design of drilled shafts 
from an economic perspective is larger than for pile groups.  
 
6.2.3 Spread Footing FN Charts 
The FN charts for spread footing were developed for the probability of exceeding 
the capacity (strength limit state) and for the probability of exceeding the service limits 
established in Chapter 3. These results were developed considering the assumptions listed 
the section 5.2.5.1.  
The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.9 for strength limit is located above the 
ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundary for risk acceptance. The curve falls within the 
region of social acceptability for civil works. The economic curve displayed in Figure 
6.10 for service limit A (3-inch settlement) is located above the ANCOLD and Hong 
Kong boundaries were risk is socially unacceptable. However, the curve still falls within 
the region of civil work acceptability.  
 130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 FN chart for spread footing strength limit state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 FN chart for spread footing service limit A. 
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Figure 6.11 FN chart for spread footing service limit B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 FN chart for spread footing service limit C. 
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The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.11 for service limit B (5-inch 
settlement) is also located above but closer to the strength limit state economic curve. 
This curve also falls within the region of civil work acceptably. The economic curve 
displayed in Figure 6.12 for service limit C (17-inch settlement) is also located above but 
closer to the service limits of less settlement to the ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundaries 
were risk is unacceptable. This curve also falls within the region of civil work acceptably. 
As the magnitudes of settlement of a bridge increase, the target probability of failure 
level approaches that of collapse. 
In general, the economic curves of drilled shafts are located at higher probability 
levels than pile group economic curves. Spread footing slope factors b are larger in 
magnitude than pile group factors therefore it is more costly to decrease the probability of 
failure of spread footing. The target level of probability of failure for the design of spread 
footing from an economic perspective is larger than for pile groups.  
 
6.2.4 Bridge Approach Embankment FN Charts 
The FN charts for bridge approach embankments were developed for the 
probability of exceeding the capacity (strength limit state) and for the probability of 
exceeding the service limits established in Chapter 3. These results were developed 
considering the assumptions listed the section 5.2.6.1.  
The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.13 for strength limit is located below 
the ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundary for risk acceptance. The curve falls within the 
region of social acceptability of ANCOLD, Hong Kong and civil works.  
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Figure 6.13 FN chart for approach embankment strength limit state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14 FN chart for approach embankment service limit A. 
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Figure 6.15 FN chart for approach embankment service limit B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16 FN chart for approach embankment service limit C. 
 135 
 
The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.14 for service limit A (3-inch 
settlement) is located below the ANCOLD and Hong Kong boundaries were risk is 
socially acceptable. In addition the curve also falls within the region of civil work 
acceptability. The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.15 for service limit B (5-inch 
settlement) is below the strength limit state economic curve and below the ANCOLD and 
Hong Kong risk boundaries. The curve also falls within the region of civil work 
acceptably. The economic curve displayed in Figure 6.16 for service limit C (17-inch 
settlement) is also located below the strength limit and closer to the ANCOLD and Hong 
Kong boundaries. This curve also falls within the region of civil work acceptably. 
Approach embankment economic curves are located at risk levels below bridge 
foundation (pile group, drilled shaft and spread footings) economic curves. Therefore the 
cost of trying to decrease the probability of failure of embankments is lower than to 
decrease the probability of failure of the bridge foundations. The target probability of 
failure of approach embankments is lower than for bridge foundations. Economically, it 
is worth designing approach embankments at high risk of failure or unsatisfactory 
performance because the low consequence cost (cheep fix). From an economic 
perspective, the target levels of probability of failure for approach embankments for both 
strength and service limits are lower than the target levels of probabilities of failure for 
bridge foundations.  
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6.3 FN charts from Sensitivity Analysis 
The bridge foundations and approach embankment economic curves shown in the 
previous section were developed considering assumed mean and coefficient of variation 
values for their design parameters. This section will address the impact (sensitivity) on 
the location of the strength limit state economic curves on FN charts when varying 
selected bridge foundation and approach embankment parameters.  
The design parameter values used to develop probability of failure-cost functions 
were obtained from the literature while the costs of material were estimated based on the 
Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) 2010 pay reports. The probability of 
failure-costs functions were observed to change when varying the values of the design 
variables. These changes were evaluated through the changes produced on the values of 
the slope factor b of each function. Description of the changes are found in section 5.3 
while summary of slope factors b are reported in tables shown in section 5.4 of Chapter 4.  
The changes in the probability of failure-cost functions when performing the 
sensitivity analysis produced changes in the expected monetary value equations which 
produced changes in the values of the optimum probabilities of failure (Popt). The 
changes in the values of the optimum probabilities of failure produced different economic 
curves on the FN charts. In the case of pile groups, a decrease in unit cost to 50 percent 
(Figure 6.17) resulted in a small displacement of the economic curve towards smaller 
probabilities of failure. Similar behavior was observed when decreasing the magnitude of 
load to 50 percent of the assumed value (Figure 6.18). Less sensitivity was observed 
when decreasing the coefficient of variation of the load to 50 percent (Figure 6.19). 
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Figure 6.17 Pile group economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change (decrease) in 
cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18 Pile group economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change in load. 
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Figure 6.19 Pile group economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change in load cov. 
 
 
In the case of drilled shafts, a small displacement of the economic curve towards 
smaller probabilities of failure also occurred when decreasing the price or unit cost of 
shaft to 50 percent (Figure 6.20) of its original value. However, when decreasing the load 
to 50 percent, drilled shafts showed to be less sensitive to change than pile groups (Figure 
6.21). A similar behavior was observed when decreasing the variability of the load to 50 
percent its original value (c.o.v. from 0.12 to 0.06). The impact is observed in Figure 6.22 
where the modified economic curve overlaps the original economic curve showing 
evidence of no sensitivity to the decrease in variability of the loads. 
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Figure 6.20 Drilled shaft economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change (decrease) in 
cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.21 Drilled shaft economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change in load. 
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Figure 6.22 Drilled shaft economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change in load cov. 
 
Spread footing economic curves exhibit displacements when decreasing the unit 
price or cost to 50 percent of its original value (Figure 6.23). The magnitude of 
displacement shows that the economic curve is sensitive to the change in load. However 
the magnitude of change in cost to produce the displacement is not likely to occur. Spread 
footings economic curves also show evidence of being sensitive to change in load (Figure 
6.24). However the change in loading that would produce the magnitude of displacement 
shown in Figure 6.24 would have probably required a different foundation design that 
would produce less or no displacement of the economic curve. The overlap of economic 
curves shown in Figure 6.25 shows that spread footings are not sensitive to changes in the 
variability of the load.  
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Figure 6.23 Spread footing economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change (decrease) in 
cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.24 Spread footing economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change in load. 
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Figure 6.25 Spread footing economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change in load cov. 
 
The behavior due to change in cost of the approach embankments economic curve 
is similar to those of bridge foundations (Figure 6.26). The change in cost affects directly 
the value of the slope factor b. The location of the economic curve in the FN chart 
depends on magnitudes of the optimum probability, Popt (which depends on the slope 
factor b) and the consequences of failure cost, X (Figure 3.6). If the numerical magnitude 
of cost would change dramatically (for example if using a different currency), then the 
economic curve would shift towards the right or left of the original economic curve 
depending on if there is an increase or decrease of the costs respectively. In this case, the 
target probabilities value would not change. The change will be of the range of interest of 
the consequence cost, X in the FN chart will shift to the right or to the left along with the 
horizontal displacement of the economic curve.  
Approach embankments are less sensitive to change in soil strength (Figure 6.27).  
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Figure 6.26 Approach embankment economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change 
(decrease) in cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.27 Approach embankment economic curve sensitivity to 50 percent change in 
undrained shear strength Su. 
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6.4 Suggested Target Levels of Probabilities of Failure 
Two steps are required to establish the suggested levels of probabilities of failure 
for the design of bridge foundations and approach embankments. The first step is to 
identify and plot the lateral (left and right) boundaries of risk for strength and service 
limits for foundations (as a group) and embankments. The second step is to identify the 
range of consequence cost for each bridge type and assign a probability of failure value 
for each range of consequence. 
Missouri bridges are classified in four groups or bridge types. There are two 
major bridge types subdivided in those that exceed or not exceed 100 million dollars. 
Then there is a third bridge type with bridges valued over 5 million dollars on major 
roads and finally a forth bridge type with values of about one million dollars on minor 
roads. 
In section 5.2 of Chapter 5, the cost of consequence of bridge failure or 
unacceptable performance was shown to be correlated to the initial cost of bridges. This 
correlation is shown for example in Figure 5.4. The ranges of consequence cost are 
established by identifying the consequence cost in Figure 5.4 when knowing the initial 
cost ranges of Missouri bridges.  
The lateral economic curves boundaries for strength and service limits for 
foundations were developed using the slope factor b ranges shown in Table 5.6. There are 
no lateral boundaries for embankments because only one “stability” method was 
analyzed. Economic curves for strength and service limits for embankments were 
developed using the slope factor b ranges shown in Table 5.5. 
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Engineering judgment is used to establish the suggested design probabilities of 
failure within the intersection of the range of consequence costs and the lateral economic 
curve boundaries. Figure 6.28 shows that suggested design probabilities of failure for 
foundation strength limit state which is shown as a step function descending within the 
economic curve boundaries.   
The suggested design probability of failure for bridge foundations considering 
service limit A (approximately 3 inch settlement) is identified in Figure 6.29 as a 
horizontal line. This line falls to the left of the range of lateral economic curve range. The 
suggested design probability of failure identified by the horizontal line is 4 percent or 1 in 
25 bridges. The line is horizontal because the cost of repairing 3-inch settlements 
(consequence cost) is almost constant regardless of the size (initial cost) of Missouri 
bridges (Figure 4.4).  
The optimum probability of failure for design is approximately 1 in 5 or 1 in 10 
bridges. However, the horizontal line was located conservatively below the economic 
curve range because of logistics and political reasons. A frequency of failure larger than 1 
in 25 would probably require an increase in personnel and equipment to constantly search 
and repair settlements. It could be considered a political decision because having more 
than 1 in 25 bridges settle 3 inches could diminish the image and trust of the DOT. It 
would also decrease the speed of travel producing a social impact difficult to quantify.  
The suggested probability of failure for foundation service limit B (approximately 
5 or 6 inches of settlement) was established by a step function located conservatively 
below the economic curve range shown in Figure 6.30.  
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Figure 6.28 Suggested foundation probabilities of failure for strength limit state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.29 Suggested foundation probabilities of failure for service limit state A. 
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The step function was located conservatively below the economic curve range for 
the same logistical and political reasons considered for service limit A. Although the step 
function could be located closer to the true economic curve because of the smaller true 
optimum probability of failure values that result in the consequence range (approximately 
1 in 100), the social (political) impact of having 5 or 6-inch settlement in a bridge pier 
would be too important.   
The graphical representation of the suggested probabilities of failure for 
foundation service limit C is shown in Figure 6.31. The step function was established 
within the range between the lateral economic curve boundaries. Considering the low true 
optimum probabilities of failure within the range of consequence, there was no need to 
locate the probability step function conservatively below the economic curve range. 
However within the economic curve range, the probability step function is located on the 
conservative side. 
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Figure 6.30 Suggested foundation probabilities of failure for service limit state B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.31 Suggested foundation probabilities of failure for service limit state C. 
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The graphical representation of the suggested probabilities of failure for approach 
embankment strength limit is shown in Figure 6.32. The horizontal line that defines the 
suggested probability of failure is located conservatively at the low (left) side of the 
economic curve. The suggested design probability of failure is 1 in 1000. The suggested 
probability of failure is decreased to avoid a loss in confidence from a political 
perspective of the department of transportation if having more than 1 in 1000 
embankments collapse. 
A similar criterion was considered when establishing the suggested design 
probability of failure considering service limit A for embankments (Figure 6.33) and 
service limit B (Figure 6.34). Their suggested design probabilities of failure are 1 in 500 
and 1 in 2000 respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.32 Suggested embankment probabilities of failure for strength limit state. 
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Figure 6.33 Suggested embankment probabilities of failure for service limit state A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.34 Suggested embankment probabilities of failure for service limit state B. 
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The suggested target probabilities, expressed in fractions corresponding to 
strength and service limit states (settlement limits) of bridge foundations and approach 
embankments are summarized in Table 6.1. Conversely, the recommended target 
reliabilities (1–Pf) are presented in Table 6.2. In both tables, bridge foundations are 
divided into four categories while embankments are classified by short-term or long-term 
stability. The recommended target probabilities of failure (Table 6.1) or reliabilities 
(Table 6.2) include considerations of both economic optimum probability of failure and 
the acceptable society level of risk.  
MoDOT modified the target probabilities of failure to be implemented in their 
design of bridge foundations and approach embankments (July, 2010). The modified 
design probabilities of failure and the target reliabilities are presented in Table 6.3 and 
Table 6.4, respectively. The major differences between the suggested and the modified 
probabilities of failure are found in MoDOT’s acceptance to design bridge foundations at 
high probabilities of failure (1 in 25 bridges) when considering service limit A (3-inch 
settlements).  
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Table 6.1 Suggested target probability of failure, Pf for the design of bridge foundations 
and embankments. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 Suggested target reliabilities R = (1- Pf) for the design of bridge foundations 
and embankments. 
 
 
Strength Service A Service B Service C
Major Bridges                            
(> $100M)
1 in 10,000 1 in 25 1 in 750 1 in 2,500
Major Bridges                           
(< $100M)
1 in 5,000 1 in 25 1 in 500 1 in 1,500
Bridges on Major Roads 1 in 1,500 1 in 25 1 in 300 1 in 1,000
Bridges on Minor Roads 1 in 300 1 in 25 1 in 200 1 in 500
Short-term Stability - - - -
Long-term Stability 1 in 1000 1 in 500 1 in 2,000 -
Application Classification
Recommended Target Probability of Failure
Bridge Foundations
Embankments
Strength Service A Service B Service C
Major Bridges                            
(> $100M)
0.99990 0.96000 0.99867 0.99960
Major Bridges                           
(< $100M)
0.99800 0.96000 0.99800 0.99933
Bridges on Major Roads 0.99933 0.96000 0.99667 0.99900
Bridges on Minor Roads 0.99667 0.96000 0.99500 0.99800
Short-term Stability - - - -
Long-term Stability 0.99900 0.99800 0.99950 -
Bridge Foundations
Embankments
Application Classification
Recommended Target Levels of Reliability
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Table 6.3 Target probability of failure, Pf for the design of bridge foundations and 
embankments (modified by MoDOT, July 2010). 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Target reliabilities R = (1- Pf) for the design of bridge foundations and 
embankments (modified by MoDOT), July 2010). 
 
 
Strength Service A Service B Service C
Major Bridges                            
(> $100M)
1 in 10,000 1 in 100 1 in 750 1 in 2,000
Major Bridges                           
(< $100M)
1 in 5,000 1 in 75 1 in 500 1 in 1,500
Bridges on Major Roads 1 in 1,500 1 in 50 1 in 250 1 in 1,000
Bridges on Minor Roads 1 in 300 1 in 25 1 in 150 1 in 750
Short-term Stability 1 in 2,000 - - -
Long-term Stability 1 in 400 1 in 150 1 in 2,000 -
Bridge Foundations
Embankments
Application Classification
Recommended Target Probability of Failure
Strength Service A Service B Service C
Major Bridges                            
(> $100M)
0.99990 0.99000 0.99867 0.99950
Major Bridges                           
(< $100M)
0.99980 0.98667 0.99800 0.99933
Bridges on Major Roads 0.99933 0.98000 0.99600 0.99900
Bridges on Minor Roads 0.99667 0.96000 0.99333 0.99867
Short-term Stability 0.99950 - - -
Long-term Stability 0.99750 0.99333 0.99950 -
Application Classification
Recommended Target Levels of Reliability
Bridge Foundations
Embankments
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6.5 LRFD Application  
Load and Resistance Factor Design method (LRFD) is an engineering designing 
method developed to consider the variability and the uncertainty of the design parameters 
in a probabilistic way. The LRFD method consists of applying factors to increase the load 
parameters and factors to decrease the resistance parameters. The values of these factors 
depend on the variability or uncertainty of a load or resistance parameter and depend on a 
desired target probability of failure.  
The suggested probabilities of failure presented in Table 6.1 are the socially 
accepted and economic optimum target probabilities of failure for the design of bridge 
foundations and approach embankments. Resistance factor can be established with the 
use of these target probabilities and with the knowledge of the variability or uncertainty 
of resistance parameters. An example of the relationship between parameter variability, 
probability of failure and resistance factors is shown in Figure 3.1 of Chapter 3. 
 
6.6 FN Chart Considerations 
The optimum probability of failure curves (also referred in this study as economic 
curves) are generated by identifying points of optimum economic probabilities of failure 
(Popt) for different consequence failure cost of bridge and approach embankments (X). 
The location of these curves in the FN chart allowed comparing them with the socially 
acceptable levels of risk to establish suggested targets of failure.  
The location of the economic curves in the FN chart depends of the value of the 
slope factor b which is obtained from the probability of failure-cost function. This factor 
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represents the cost required to decrease the probability of failure of the infrastructure 
(bridge foundation and/or approach embankment) by one order of magnitude. A large 
slope factor b would indicate that it is very expensive to decrease the probability of 
failure by one order of magnitude. 
Large slope factors b locate economic curves towards the right at higher 
consequence costs in the FN chart. This effect would also seem to locate the economic 
curve at a higher position where the probabilities of failure are larger. In this case, to 
lower the design target probability of failure of a economic curve that is located at high 
probability of failure region on the FN chart requires a larger investment than to lower 
design target probability of failure of a economic curve that is located at low probability 
of failure region. For example, it is more expensive to reduce the probability of failure for 
service limit A which economic curves are located at high probabilities of failure in the 
FN chart (socially unaccepted) than it is to reduce the probability of failure of strength 
limit which economic curves are located at lower possibilities of failure levels in the 
chart.  
In the case of foundation service limit A, the cost of selecting a smaller than 1 in 
25 design probability of failure is expensive (Figure 6.29). To choose a smaller 
probability of failure would not agree with the purpose of designing for the optimum 
economic probability of failure. For the economic curve developed for approach 
embankments considering service limit A (Figure 6.33), to decrease the design target 
probability of failure will cost less than to decrease the design target probability of failure 
of bridge foundations considering service limit A (Figure 6.29).  
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6.7 Summary 
In this chapter, economic curves for pile groups, drilled shafts, spread footings 
and approach embankments were developed based the probability of failure-cost 
functions presented in Chapter 5. The locations of these economic curves in the FN charts 
were evaluated with respect to their proximity to socially acceptable risk boundaries and 
regions.  
Sensitivity analysis was performed to evaluate the changes in the probability of 
failure-cost functions and the changes of location of the economic curves in the FN charts 
when varying costs, loads and load variability. Results showed through the impact on the 
value of the slope factor b, that the functions were sensitive to the changes. However the 
changes in the function did not produce important changes in the location of the 
economic curves due to the fact that these curves were plotted on log-log scaled charts 
(FN charts).  
In the case of the sensitivity to changes in cost, the changes affected directly the 
value of the slope factor b producing a horizontal shift of the economic curve in the FN 
chart. The direction of the shift depended on the increase or decrease of cost. This shift 
would not modify the design target probabilities of failure (Popt), as long as the range of 
consequence cost (X) (horizontal axis of the FN chart) shifts accordantly to the change in 
cost.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis performed considering the change in load 
show that this parameter also impacted the probability of failure-cost function through the 
change produced in the slope factor b. The impact was observed to be less important in 
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the location of the economic curves due to the fact that these curves were plotted on log-
log scaled charts (FN charts).  A significant change (increase) in the mean working load 
of a bridge is expected to be foreseen by designers. In this case it is likely that an 
appropriate foundation type and size would be selected and a different probability cost 
function would be generated. 
  The process to establish the suggested target probabilities of failure consisted in 
developing step functions in FN charts between the intersection of the ranges of 
consequence costs of geotechnical infrastructures and the region located between upper 
and lower economic curves for each level of failure (i.e. strength and three service 
limits). The upper and lower economic curves boundaries were developed considering the 
envelope of slope factor b (upper and lower extreme values) of all foundation types for 
each level of failure. Refinement of the location of the step function to establish the 
suggested probability of failure was based on judgment taking into account the societal 
and political acceptance of failure.   
The suggested target probabilities of failure (or reliabilities), expressed as 
fractions corresponding to strength and service limit states (settlement limits) of bridge 
foundations and approach embankments and the recommended target reliabilities (1–Pf) 
were summarized and presented in tables. Tables showing MoDOT’s modified design 
probability values are also presented for comparison.  
The suggested target probabilities of failure were explained to be useful along 
with the knowledge of the variability or uncertainty of a resistance parameter to establish 
resistance factors in the LRFD method. Finally, consideration of the understanding of the 
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location of the economic curves on the FN chart and the economic limitation of selecting 
more conservative target probabilities of failure based on its location was described.   
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7 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The suggested target levels of probability of failure, or conversely, reliability to 
be used to develop resistance factors for the design of bridge foundations and 
embankments are presented in this chapter. Details of the development of the values were 
presented in previous chapters. Several considerations for implementing the suggested 
target probabilities of failure are addressed. 
 
7.2 Acceptable Probabilities of Failure and FN Charts 
The suggested levels of target probabilities of failure, Pf were established by 
comparing and combining economic optimization and societal acceptance of risk. In this 
study, risk is considered as the probability of failure multiplied by the consequence. 
While the societal acceptance of risk is based on the societal acceptability of loss of life 
(expressed in terms of money), the economic optimization is based on the identification 
of the probability of failure that minimizes the life cycle cost of a geotechnical 
infrastructure. 
Societal acceptance is generally reported through FN charts which are 
logarithmic-scaled plots that show the frequency F of an event against the number of 
fatalities N. The curves of these plots (Figure 7.1) define regions or level of risks that are 
generally dependent on the societal acceptability for the loss of life or some other 
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undesired consequence. Three areas of risk are distinguished in Figure 7.1: the acceptable 
level of risk where permissible activities lie, the unacceptable levels of risk, and an 
intermediate range of risk or as low as reasonably possibly (ALARP) where reduction of 
risk is desirable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Regions of acceptable, “as low as reasonably possibly” (ALARP) and 
unacceptable levels of risk on FN curves (after Hong Kong Government Planning 
Department, 1994) 
 
FN curves are developed and used by several international agencies to quantify 
risk and to make policy decisions as objective as possible. A plot of the average annual 
probabilities of failure of traditional civil facilities and large structures (Baecher & 
Christian, 2003) overlying the FN curves developed by the Australian National 
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Committee on Large Dams, ANCOLD (1994) and by the Hong Kong Government 
Planning Department (1994) is shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2. FN chart: Average annual probabilities for traditional civil facilities overlying 
ANCOLD and Hong Kong societal based risk limits (after: Baecher & Christian, 2003, 
ANCOLD, 1994, and Hong Kong Government Planning Department, 1994).  
 
The probabilities of failure established by economic analysis involve the 
evaluation of the potential costs of failure (consequences, X) and the required investment 
(initial cost, A) to reduce the consequences. Conceptually, the investment and 
consequence costs are balanced. Mathematically, they are established by identifying the 
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infrastructure.  The life-cycle cost is expressed through the expected monetary value, E 
equation (Equation 7.1): 
    𝐸 = 𝐴 + 𝑃 ∙ 𝑋    
Equation 7.1 
Where, 
  E = expected monetary value 
  A = geotechnical infrastructure initial cost 
  P = probability of failure 
  X = consequence/repair cost 
Several curves developed for different consequence costs (X) are shown in Figure 
7.3 in which the optimum probabilities of failure are identified at the minimum cost value 
of the infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Life-cycle cost curves for specific values of infrastructure consequence of 
failure costs, X. Circles denote optimum probability of failure.  
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The suggested probabilities of failure are established by overlapping or 
intersecting the economic and societal probability regions on an FN chart. Additional 
engineering judgment is applied to select the probabilities depending on the size (cost) of 
the infrastructure and the variability of the design parameters. Two economic probability 
curves for the design of drilled shaft capacity super-imposed on the socially acceptable 
probability of failure curves are shown in Figure 7.4. These probability curves (economic 
curves) correspond to different levels of variability (coefficient of variation, c.o.v.) of 
design parameters.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Economic probabilities for the design of drilled shafts overlapping the 
socially acceptable probabilities on an FN chart. Coefficient of variation, c.o.v., 
represents different levels of uncertainty in design parameters. 
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7.3 Suggested Target Probabilities of Failure (Pf) and Reliabilities (R) 
The suggested target probabilities, expressed in fractions corresponding to 
capacity strength and service limit states (settlement limits) of bridge foundations and 
approach embankments are given in Table 7.1. Conversely, the suggested target 
reliabilities (1–Pf) are presented in Table 7.2. In both tables, bridge foundations are 
divided into four categories while embankments are classified by short-term or long-term 
stability. The suggested target probabilities of failure or reliabilities in Table 7.1 and 
Table 7.2 respectively include considerations of both economic optimum probability of 
failure and the socially acceptable probability of failure.  
The suggested target probabilities of failure and reliabilities for the service levels 
for bridge foundations were developed considering Service Level A corresponds to minor 
damage, Service Level B corresponds to intermediate damage and Service Level C 
corresponds to major damage. Minor damage was defined to be caused by values of 
differential settlement that would produce angular distortions on the order of 0.0021. 
Intermediate damage was defined as the limit for a bridge to suffer structural damage 
(angular distortion at about 0.004). Major damage was defined as the limit to produce 
extreme stress (overstress) in the superstructure. The three service limits will not 
necessarily be implemented in the final specification but are necessary as an intermediate 
step to ensure that serviceability issues do not begin to control when strength limit state 
design checks are improved. For approach embankments, Service Level A corresponds to 
a 3-inch settlement at the bridge abutment while Service Level B corresponds to a 12-
inch settlement at the bridge abutment.  
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Table 7.1 Suggested target probability of failure, Pf for the design of bridge foundations 
and embankments 
 
 
 
Table 7.2 Suggested target reliabilities R = (1- Pf) for the design of bridge foundations 
and embankments 
 
 
 
Strength Service A Service B Service C
Major Bridges                            
(> $100M)
1 in 10,000 1 in 25 1 in 750 1 in 2,500
Major Bridges                           
(< $100M)
1 in 5,000 1 in 25 1 in 500 1 in 1,500
Bridges on Major Roads 1 in 1,500 1 in 25 1 in 300 1 in 1,000
Bridges on Minor Roads 1 in 300 1 in 25 1 in 200 1 in 500
Short-term Stability - - - -
Long-term Stability 1 in 1000 1 in 500 1 in 2,000 -
Application Classification
Recommended Target Probability of Failure
Bridge Foundations
Embankments
Strength Service A Service B Service C
Major Bridges                            
(> $100M)
0.99990 0.96000 0.99867 0.99960
Major Bridges                           
(< $100M)
0.99800 0.96000 0.99800 0.99933
Bridges on Major Roads 0.99933 0.96000 0.99667 0.99900
Bridges on Minor Roads 0.99667 0.96000 0.99500 0.99800
Short-term Stability - - - -
Long-term Stability 0.99900 0.99800 0.99950 -
Bridge Foundations
Embankments
Application Classification
Recommended Target Levels of Reliability
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The suggested target probabilities of failure and probabilities of reaching a service 
limit for bridge foundations increase as bridge size decreases. This behavior follows the 
FN curves in which the optimum target probability of failure increases as the 
consequence of failure decreases. The suggested target probabilities of failure for 
embankments follow similar behavior.  
The suggested target probabilities for reaching a specific service limit state (A, B, 
C) decrease as the magnitude of the service limit (A<B<C) increases for any size of 
bridge. At low consequences produced by small distortions (or settlements), the optimum 
probability of settlement is large following the risk and FN curves.  
While the calculated probabilities of failure represent a continuous function (a 
line/curve), the suggested probabilities of failure are discrete values that can be used over 
a range of consequence costs, or initial costs, depending on the bridge size. The 
suggested probability step function produced by the combination of economic and 
societal probabilities versus the initial cost of the bridge is shown in Figure 7.5. Each step 
of the function identifies target probability of failure for strength for the four classified 
bridge sizes (major bridges for more than $100M, major bridges less than $100M, 
bridges on major roads and bridges on minor roads). 
Similar target probability of failure step functions were developed to establish the 
probability of failure for service limit states. The discrete probabilities of reaching the 
service limit states versus consequence (repair) cost are shown in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.5. Suggested discrete probabilities of failure versus initial cost of a bridge for the 
design of the capacity (strength limit state, LS) of bridge foundations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6. Suggested discrete probabilities of reaching a specific service limit state 
versus repair cost of the bridge for design foundations. 
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7.4 Considerations for the Suggested Probabilities of Failure 
The suggested probabilities of failure although expressed in fractions with large 
denominators are independent of the number of bridges an agency may build. Each 
probability has been identified as the optimum probability of failure from an economic 
perspective that balances the initial bridge infrastructure with the potential consequence 
cost of failure. The suggested target probabilities of failure can be used to calculate 
resistance factors for the design of bridge foundations and approach embankments using 
the LRFD method. In general the LRFD method consists of increasing the load and 
decreasing the resistance with the use of factors. Normally, one factor is used for each 
design parameter. The values of these factors depend on the uncertainty or variability of 
the parameters and the target probability of failure. In 2005 Loehr et al. developed 
relationships (curves) that related resistance factors with the variability of soil parameters 
(soil resistance) and the target probability of failure for the design of earth slopes. An 
example of this relationship is shown in Figure 7.7.  
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Figure 7.7. Resistance factor relations for undrained shear strength for probabilities of 
failure of 0.1, 0.01, 0.001, with respect to stability analyses of slopes (Loehr et al. 2005). 
 
 
In Figure 7.7, different curves are shown for different targets of probability of 
slope failure. The range of the resistance factors varies between 0.0 and 1.0.  They are a 
function of the variability of the soil parameter (expressed in terms of the coefficient of 
variation, COV) and are dependent on a selected probability of failure. This dissertation 
research suggests the use of the target probability of failure presented in Table 7.1 for the 
design of bridge foundations and approach embankment using LRFD.  
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7.5 Summary 
Suggested target levels of probability of failure (reliability) to be used to develop 
resistance factors for the design of bridge foundations and approach embankments were 
presented. The suggested probabilities of failure were established by comparing socially 
acceptable risk levels with economic optimization of probability of failure (or reliability). 
Target levels are established by identifying the optimum probability that minimizes the 
life cycle cost of the geotechnical infrastructure. Probabilities of failure for ultimate 
strength and service limit states were classified by bridge size and type. The probabilities 
of failure for strength limit states range from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 300 for bridges greater 
than 100 million dollars to bridges on minor roads. The probabilities of failure for service 
limit states range from 1 in 2000 to 1 in 25 for bridges greater than 100 million dollars to 
bridges on minor roads. The probability of reaching a service limit state decreases as the 
magnitude of the limit state increases. 
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8 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the dissertation, followed by a series of major 
conclusions reached based on the results of this work. In addition, a series of 
recommendations are provided to facilitate the implementation of the levels of risk for 
the design of bridge foundations and approach embankments.  
 
8.1 Summary 
Traditionally, the factor of safety (F.S.) for the design of slopes and foundations 
was calculated through the method Allowable Stress Design (ASD). The factor of safety 
calculated with this method accounted for all the variability and uncertainties in the loads 
and resistance. Although this empirical method has been used successfully for many 
years, it lacked the capability of assigning consistent levels of safety (reliability) to 
different sites that had different variability and uncertainty of resistance values.  
Currently the level of reliability, which is also expressed as the probability of 
failure or risk (probability of failure multiplied by the consequence) is mainly established 
by an AASHTO specification committee. In the AASHTO specifications (2004), the 
design risk is established at one ten thousandth (or 0.0001). The disadvantage of 
establishing a single target level of safety for all structures is that it does not consider the 
increase in cost required to achieve this reliability. 
In some cases, the level of risk is established using the Load and Resistance 
Factor Design (LRFD) method as a function of the variability of the loads and 
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resistances. According to the approach, a low level of risk would be established where the 
uncertainty or load and resistance variability are low. This approach goes against the 
philosophy of LRFD because the level of risk is adjusted for the variability of the 
parameters instead of adjusting load and resistance factors to achieve a target level of 
risk. 
The objective of this study is to determine the target levels of reliability (or levels 
of safety) for the design of bridge foundations and approach embankments using LRFD. 
According to the hypothesis, these levels of reliability can be established by combining 
societal acceptance of risk and economic analysis.  
Normally societal acceptance is expressed in terms of tolerable limits of risk and 
generally reported through FN curves, which summarize the relation between frequencies 
of failure (F) and number of lives lost (N). Although the consequences of failure in FN 
charts are normally expressed in terms of the number of losses of human lives, it is 
possible to assign a value to human life and express the losses in terms of monetary 
value. In this case, the FN curves would constitute boundaries between regions on the 
plot that define the acceptance or non-acceptance of probabilities of failure for a potential 
amount of loss. From an economic perspective, an FN curve (economic curve) constitutes 
a curve developed by a family of points that represent the “optimum” probability of 
failure for a given loss. 
The life-cycle cost of a geotechnical infrastructure was expressed through an 
expected monetary value equation, E.  Based on decision theory, the E was considered a 
measure of the value or utility expected to result from a given strategy (decision), equal 
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to the sum of the initial investment cost of the infrastructure plus the probability of 
incurring in a consequence cost.  
The mathematical expression to denote the expected monetary value was:  
 
𝐸 = 𝐴 + 𝑃 ∙ 𝑋 
Where, 
 E = expected monetary value 
A = initial cost of the civil work 
P = the probability of failure   
 X = consequential cost of failure 
 
The number of unknown variables of the EMV equation was simplified by 
obtaining a relation between the initial costs A and the probability of failure P:  
 
𝐸 = (𝑏 ∙ 𝐿𝑛𝑃 + 𝑑) +  𝑃 ∙ 𝑋 
Where, 
b = the slope factor , and 
d = the vertical intercept at Pf = 1.0 
The optimum probability of failure has been defined as the probability of failure that 
makes the expected monetary value the minimum (tangent slope is zero). This was 
calculated by deriving expected monetary value (E) with respect to the probability of 
failure (P). The probability (P) at which the expected monetary value was found 
minimum was defined as the optimum probability of failure (Popt). 
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𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 =
−𝑏
𝑋
 
 
The value of the slope factor b (slope of the probability of failure versus cost 
function) was obtained from the relation generated between the initial cost A and the 
probability of failure of the geotechnical infrastructure X. The slope factor b represents 
the cost required to decrease the probability of failure by one order of magnitude. The 
relations between the probabilities of failure and the costs were established with the use 
of reliability analyses (Taylor Series Method). 
Different values of consequence costs X produced families of optimum 
probability points Popt generating continuous curves (economic curves) when plotted on 
FN-charts. Sensitivity analysis was performed on the function between the cost and the 
probability of failure by varying the assumed values of the variables that defined stability 
of the infrastructure. The impact on the economic curves when changing the variable 
values was also analyzed. 
Optimum economic socially acceptable bands were identified between envelopes 
of economic curves generated for all foundation types (pile group, drilled shafts and 
spread footing). Step functions were developed within the envelopes of economic curves 
to identify the recommended probability of failure of bridges according to their 
consequence cost (Figure 8.1).    
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Figure 8.1 Example of probability of failure (risk) step function generated within 
foundation economic curve envelope according to the consequence of bridge failure.   
 
The risk functions were compared with the societal tolerance of risk. Comments 
regarding the judgments used to establish the recommended target levels of risk 
(probabilities of failure) are presented for different types of bridge failure (collapse, and 
three levels of settlement). A final table of recommended probabilities of failure and 
reliability are presented in the study. Finally, a general procedure is presented on the 
application of the recommended probabilities of failure to obtain reducing factor for the 
design of bridges and approach embankment using LRFD.  
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8.2 Conclusions 
The hypothesis underlying this research effort was that the target levels of 
reliability (or levels of safety) for the design of geotechnical infrastructure using LRFD 
can be established through a combination of the economic optimization of their life cycle 
cost through probabilistic analysis of failure and the identification and incorporation of 
societal tolerance to risk. 
The following conclusions were drawn based on the findings: 
1. As an answer to the hypothesis, the results of this dissertation research 
show that it is possible to develop target levels of reliability (or 
probabilities of failure) for the design of geotechnical infrastructure and 
approach embankments based on a combination of cost analysis and 
societal acceptance of failure. 
2. The significance of the procedure proposed is that the levels of reliability 
obtained from the optimization of cost and risk, allows decreasing the 
costs of infrastructures while designing to a consistent known level of 
safety.  
3. The engineering procedure proposed is robust and can be applied to 
develop target reliabilities for the design of other civil works. 
4. The suggested target probabilities of failure are to be used to calculate 
resistance factors for the design of bridge foundations and approach 
embankments using the LRFD method. The results of this work are 
already being implemented to develop new design specifications for piles, 
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drilled shafts, shallow foundations and approach embankments for the 
Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT). 
5. Social considerations control the establishment of target levels of 
reliability for bridge foundations at strength limit state. Conversely, 
economic considerations control the establishment of target levels of 
reliability for bridge foundation for service limit states.  
6. The proposed procedure allows updating the target levels of reliability for 
the design of geotechnical infrastructure if costs were to change. 
 
8.3 Recommendations 
The following recommendations were drawn based on the results of analyses: 
1. The procedure proposed in this dissertation research should now be 
extended to be implemented to other civil infrastructure. 
2. The consequence costs of bridge failure did not include the social impact 
due to traffic. Considering that the true extent of the social impact on 
business is very difficult to quantify and that these costs are not paid by 
the Departments of Transportation, it is recommended not to include these 
values in the consequence costs of bridge or approach embankment 
failures.   
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Table A 1. Format of the bridge cost information answer sheet for the questionnaire filled 
by the Missouri Department of Transportation, MoDOT. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 2. Characteristics and costs of selected Missouri bridges (MoDOT).  
 
 
 
Deck Crack Structural Severe
Settlement (in) 3 6 12
M
oD
O
T
's
 R
ec
om
m
en
de
d 
R
ep
ai
r
Estimate cost 
Estimated 
economic 
impact
Year Built
Bidding Cost
Bridge: MoDOT A3101 (Fed ID 2664)
Damage Level
Bridge Type
Number of 
Spans
Lengths (ft)
Critical Span 
Length (ft)
Deck 
Cracking
Structural Severe
Year of 
Construction
Initial Cost
Present 
Initial Cost
A3390 C.C. 4 48 - 60 - 48 - 35 35 2.0 4.0 8.0 1981 206,548 491,557
A4824 PS. C 4 82 - 82 - 82 - 82 82 2.5 4.0 18.0 2005 758,505 840,181
A3101 C.C., SP 2 120 - 120 120 3.0 6.0 12.0 1987 544,144 1,036,221
A6248 C.C., SP 6 120 - 179 - 132 - 107.5 - 135 - 107.5 107.5 3.0 6.0 30.0 2001 4,259,949 5,206,524
A5054 C.C., SP 26
(85, 85, 170, 105, 640, 220, 220, 220, 
220, 220, 220, 130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 
130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 
130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 151, 218, 
85 2.5 5.0 18.0 1996 22,534,581 31,070,146
Damage Level (Settlement inches)
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Table A 3. Repair costs for 5 Missouri bridges considering 3 service limit states.  
 
 
Table A 4. Missouri bridge costs for Service Limit State A (minor damage). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3390 A3101 A4824 A6248 A5054
Inspection 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Wedge approach 1,200 1,200 3,400 1,800 5,900 5,900
Seal cracked areas. 2,000 3,000 2,000 3,000 2,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 4,000
Chip seal entire deck 800 800 120,000 1,400 1,400 80,000 1,200 7,000 7,000 1,900 1,900 200,000
Replace deck 1,200,000
Replace spans 140,000 140,000 1,000,000
New bearings 6,000
Strengthen foundation 40,000 100,000
Deep foundation 200,000 200,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 350,000 350,000 600,000 600,000
Replace 2nd series of spans 200,000 950,000 950,000 3,000,000 1,500,000
Replace partial approach slab 15,000 30,000 15,000 30,000 30,000 40,000 80,000
Estimated Cost 6,000 222,000 552,000 8,800 271,400 1,312,000 7,000 432,000 1,372,000 17,000 462,000 5,552,000 13,800 653,800 2,382,000
Est. Economic Impact 90,000 90,000 90,000 10,500 45,000 45,000 10,500 67,500 67,500 94,000 252,000 720,000 35,000 150,000 200,000
Repairing the cause 50,000 100,000 50,000 100,000 50,000 100,000 0 50,000 100,000 0 80,000 250,000
Investigation cause 15,000 30,000 50,000 15,000 30,000 50,000 15,000 30,000 50,000 15,000 30,000 50,000 15,000 60,000 100,000
Bridge Type
Estimate 
Cost
Economic 
Impact
Cause 
Repair
Cause 
Investigati
on
Total
A3390 C.C. 6,000 21,000 - 15,000 21,000
A4824 PS. C 7,000 10,500 - 15,000 22,000
A3101 C.C., SP 8,800 10,500 - 15,000 23,800
A6248 C.C., SP 17,000 94,000 - 15,000 32,000
A5054 C.C., SP 13,800 35,000 - 15,000 28,800
Deck Cracking - Costs
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Table A 5. Missouri bridge costs for Service Limit State B (intermediate damage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 6. Missouri bridge costs for Service Limit State C (major damage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bridge Type
Estimate 
Cost
Economic 
Impact
Cause 
Repair
Cause 
Investigati
Total
A3390 C.C. 222,000 90,000 50,000 30,000 302,000
A4824 PS. C 432,000 67,500 50,000 30,000 512,000
A3101 C.C., SP 271,400 45,000 50,000 30,000 351,400
A6248 C.C., SP 462,000 252,000 50,000 30,000 542,000
A5054 C.C., SP 653,800 150,000 80,000 60,000 793,800
Structural Damage - Costs
Bridge Type
Estimate 
Cost
Economic 
Impact
Cause 
Repair
Cause 
Investigati
Total
A3390 C.C. 552,000 90,000 100,000 50,000 702,000
A4824 PS. C 1,372,000 67,500 100,000 50,000 1,522,000
A3101 C.C., SP 1,312,000 45,000 100,000 50,000 1,462,000
A6248 C.C., SP 5,552,000 720,000 100,000 50,000 5,702,000
A5054 C.C., SP 2,382,000 200,000 250,000 100,000 2,732,000
Severe Damage - Costs
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Table A 7. Bridge settlement repair costs for 3 service limit states. 
 
 
 
 
Table A 8. Calculations of different settlement limits for three levels of bridge damage 
using angular distortion  method. 
 
 
 
Bridge
Year of 
Construction
Past     
Initial Cost
Year 2010 
Initial Cost
Service A 
Repair Cost
Service B 
Repair Cost
Service C 
Repair Cost
A3390 1981 206,548 491,557 21,000 302,000 702,000
A4824 2005 758,505 840,181 22,000 512,000 1,522,000
A3101 1987 544,144 1,036,221 23,800 351,400 1,462,000
A6248 2001 4,259,949 5,206,524 32,000 542,000 5,702,000
A5054 1996 22,534,581 31,070,146 28,800 793,800 2,732,000
Bridge
Number 
of Spans
Lengths
Critica
l Span 
Length
t (ft)
Angular 
Distortion
Differential 
Settlement 
(in)
Angular 
Distortion
Differential 
Settlement 
(in)
Num of 
Spans
Dist 
outer 
fiber C
fo/fa oC/fo
Differential 
Settlement 
(in)
A3101 2 120 - 120 120 0.71 0.0021 3.0 0.004 5.8 2 15 3.6 45 10.8
A6248 6 120 - 179 - 132 - 107.5 - 135 - 107.5 107.5 0.71 0.0021 2.7 0.004 5.2 6 15 3.6 120 28.8
A5054 26
(85, 85, 170, 105, 640, 220, 220, 
220, 220, 220, 220, 130.5, 130.5, 
130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 
130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 130.5, 
151, 218, 145) 
85 0.71 0.0021 2.1 0.004 4.1 26 15 3.6 70 16.8
A4824 4 82 - 82 - 82 - 82 82 0.71 0.0021 2.1 0.004 3.9 4 15 3.6 70 16.8
A3390 4 48 - 60 - 48 - 35 35 0.71 0.0021 0.9 0.004 1.7 4 9 3.6 19 7.6
Theoretical Bearn/Girder YieldTheoretical Deck Cracking Observered Structural
Structure Analysis Settlement Criteria Maximum Stress Criteria
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Figure A.1  Elevation view of Bridge MoDOT A6248 (Fed ID 12126) located in Jackson 
County, NB I-435 over Ramp N(71)-E, Ramp N(435)-E, Ramp N(435)-S, and U.S. 71. It 
is a concrete continuous deck with steel plate girders bridge type, with 6 spans, (120, 179, 
132, 107.5, 135, 107.5) ft. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2  Elevation view of Bridge MoDOT 4824 located in McDonald County, over 
Big Sugar Creek, State Road from Rte. KK to Barry CO Line about 0.2 miles N.E. of Rte 
KK. It is a prestressed Concrete I-Girders spans bridge type, with 4 spans, (82, 82, 82, 
82) ft. 
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Figure A.3  Elevation view of Bridge MoDOT 3101 (Fed ID 2664) located in Jefferson 
County, Bridge Rock Creek Road Underpass, State Road 21, about 4 miles south of 
Route 141. It is a continuous deck composite with steel plate girders bridge type with 2 
spans, (120, 120) ft. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.4  Elevation view of Bridge MoDOT 3390 (Fed ID 2856) located in Clay 
County, Ramp 2 over Ramp 9, State Road from Rte. I-35 to Rte. 210 at I-35 & I-435 
Interchange. It is a concrete continuous bridge type with 4 spans, (48, 60, 48, 35) ft. 
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